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ABSTRACT
PEIRCE'S CRITIQUE OF INTROSPECTION
May, 1978

Gayle Lynn Stephens, B.A.
M.A. and Ph.D.

,

Directed by:

,

Harvard College

University of Massachusetts
Professor Bruce Aune

In one of his earliest philosophical essays, "Questions
Concerning

Certain Faculties Claimed for Man", Charles Sanders Peirce advances the
thesis that "We have no power of Introspection".

Although this thesis

plays a significant role in his philosophy of mind, it has thus far re-

ceived little serious attention.

I

expound this thesis and examine in

detail three arguments Peirce offers in its support.
draws upon Peircean views on other topics.

Each argument

For this reason,

I

devote

some effort to working out his account of our initial experience of our
own mental states, his theory of mental activity, and his distinction

between the psychical and the external.

I

conclude that, though he

fails to establish the strongest version of the claim that we have no

power of introspection, his critique of introspection is a qualified
success
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INTRODUCTION
In 1868 Peirce wrote two essays "in the
spirit of opposition to

Cartesianism."

These essays, "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties

Claimed for Man" and "Some Consequences of Four
Incapacities," launch

wide ranging attack on the Cartesian tradition in
philosophy.

a

Among the

positions that come under fire is the doctrine that we
have introspective knowledge of mind.

Peirce rejects this claim, maintaining the

thesis that "we have no power of introspection."

This thesis reappears

throughout his works and forms an important theme in his philosophy
of
mind.

Despite its importance, Peirce's commentators have directed their

attention elsewhere and his critique of introspection has usually received a very cursory treatment

1

believe that his views on intro-

I

.

spection merit serious examination and they can neither be understood nor evaluated without a fairly extensive discussion.

propose,

I

therefore, to critically examine Peirce's contention that we have no

power of introspection and certain arguments he offers in support of that
view.

^The following works on Peirce’s philosophy have something to say
about his critique of introspection.
(I shall list the author and the
work in chronological order, full citations are provided in the bibliography.) Justus Buchler, Charles Peirce's Empiricism 1939; James K.
Feibleman, An Introduction to Peirce's Philosophy 19^6; George Gentry,
"Peirce's Early and Later Theory of Cognition and Meaning," 19^6;
Thomas Goudge The Thought of C. S_. Peirce 1950; Manley Thompson, The
Pragmatic Philosophy of C. S_. Peirce 1953; Murray G. Murphey The
Development of Peirce's Philosophy 196l; Larry Holmes, "Prolegomena
to Peirce's Philosophy of Mind," 196U; W. B. Gallie, Peirce and PragOnly Gallie
matisrn, 1966
Israel Scheffler, Four Pragmatists 19 7 7
than
summarize Peirce's discussion.
makes a serious attempt to do more
(See Chapter Three of his Peirce and Pragmatism
,

,

,

,

,

,

,

,

;

.

•

Vlll

I

project

should make clear from the beginning the
limitations of the
I

shall undertake.

A full treatment of Peirce's critique of

introspection would have to deal at length with
his theory of signs, his

metaphysics, and his general theory of knowledge.

my discussion to manageable size,

I

In order to restrict

shall focus on three arguments

Peirce offers in support of his views on introspection.

I

shall con-

sider his positions on other issues only in so far
as they are relevant
to these arguments.

The three arguments selected are not the only

arguments in his works concerning introspection;
I

they are the arguments

consider the most interesting and the most important.

I

hope to make

a good start on the interpretation and criticism of Peirce's
critique of

introspection, but

I

shall leave much to be done.

Peirce's three arguments differ in what they try to show.
first, drawn from ’'Questions”,

5

.244- .249*

,

In the

he regards as introspective

any knowledge of the internal world not derived from external observation.

When he concludes in 5-249 that we have no power of introspec-

tion, he is maintaining that our whole knowledge of the internal world

derives by inference from external facts.

The second argument involves

both a narrower conception of introspection and less extensive claims
concerning which sorts of knowledge are not introspective.

In this

argument, which occurs in "Consequences”, Peirce contends that one
cannot ascertain by "direct perception" the nature of one's current

*A11 references to Peirce's writings are to the Collected Papers
of Charles Sanders Peirce published in eight volumes by the Harvard
University Press. The number preceding the decimal point refers to
the volume, those following to the paragraph. I shall dispense with
page references. See bibliography for full citation.

IX

mental state or activities.

That is, one cannot distinguish joy from

anger or reasoning from reverie, for
example, simply by inspecting the
sorts of mental states in question.

He is not concerned here to estab-

lish that one's ability to tell whether one
is angry depends upon one's

knowledge of external facts, or that all one's knowledge
of the internal

world is inferential.
The third argument lies scattered throughout Peirce's
later works.
As with the second, Peirce considers only a certain
sort of psychological

knowledge.

The term "introspection", as he uses it in his later works,

refers to knowledge of the internal as internal.

what
(l)

I

shall call the problem of location.

He is concerned with

This problem has two aspects:

How does one recognize that mental phenomena are mental or, to use

Peirce's terminology, belong to the internal world?

(2) How does one

recognize that a given mental phenomenon belongs to one's own internal
world?

Peirce does not always keep these issues distinct, though his

third argument covers both.

The third argument resembles the second in

its restricted scope, but it resembles the first in its ambition to show

that knowledge of the internal as internal derives from external facts
Its conclusion is that one's knowledge of the location of one's mental

phenomena depends upon knowledge of the external world.
In all three arguments Peirce maintains, at least, that some of our

knowledge of our own minds is inferential.
farther than the other two.

The first argument goes

If Peirce can show that all our knowledge

of the inner world derives by inference from external facts, the weaker

conclusions of the second and third arguments will be established by

X

implication.
argument, in

For this reason,
Questions".

I

I

shall begin by considering Peirce's

believe that this argument fails.

In

order to see whether he can salvage something of his
critique of intro-

spection,

I

shall consider his later arguments.

more successful and,

I

These arguments are

shall contend, provide good reason to reject

certain elements of the Cartesian position on introspective knowledge.
In this connection I offer a final introductory note.

shall occasionally cite Descartes,

I

Although

I

intend that my use of the term

"Cartesian" should correspond, in general, to Peirce's.

I

shall attempt

neither to develop the Cartesian position in its own right nor to show
that Peirce correctly interprets that position.
I

At one point, however,

feel that it is important to understand the nature of the Cartesian

view.

I

shall note that point when it arises.

CHAPTER

I

A PRELIMINARY LOOK AT QUESTION FOUR
Peirce's earliest published discussion of
introspection appears

under the fourth of the seven questions he
raises in "Questions Concerning Faculties Claimed for Man."

He opens the discussion by asking

"Whether we have any power of introspection" and
brings it to a con-

clusion with the assertion that "There is no reason
for supposing a

power of introspection; and, consequently, the only way
of investigating
a psychological question is by inference from
external facts."

chapter

I

In this

shall take a preliminary look at the argument contained
in the

five paragraphs intervening between Question Four and this
conclusion.

I

shall consider that argument more closely in Chapter II.
It may seem excessive to devote two chapters to five paragraphs

More likely, my discussion is too brief.

William James described Peirce's

essay as "extremely bold, subtle, and incomprehensible "^
.

James'

assessment applies in full force to the argument of these five paragraphs.

These passages bristle with unacknowledged assumptions, unexplained
terms and unsupported assertions.

Even in saying that

I

shall provide

a preliminary exposition of Peirce's argument, I overstate my intentions:
it is by no means clear what argument he makes in the paragraphs under

discussion.

Nor does the discussion of Peirce's views on introspection

"'"Quoted in

William James

.

Ralph Barton Perry's The Thought and Character of
Boston, 1936, p. 2.

1

2

in the secondary literature fill in the gaps in the
original.

Among

Peirce’s commentators, only W. B. Gallie undertakes much more
than a

summary of the text.

I

shall record my objections to Gallie' s inter-

pretation in the course of this chapter.

The above considerations

justify the length, if not the content, of my exposition.
As I mentioned, the question whether we have a power of intro-

spection is the fourth Peirce considers in his essay.

Since he pre-

supposes the answers to the three preceding questions in his discussion
of the fourth, a brief review of the earlier questions will be helpful.

Question One

:

Whether by the simple contemplation

of a cognition, independently of any previous knowledge

and without reasoning from signs, we are enabled rightly

to judge whether that cognition has been determined

by previous cognitions or whether it refers immediately
to its object.
In Question One Peirce asks whether we can know intuitively that a

given cognition is an intuition.

An intuition, he says, is "a cognition

not determined by a previous cognition

.

.

.

,

and therefore so determined

by something out of the consciousness” (5-213).

As the wording of

Question One suggests, he regards intuitive knowledge as arising simply
from contemplation or inspection of its object.

He does not explain,

however, what it is for one cognition to "determine" another.

He does

make clear that the notion takes in a fairly broad range of relations
among thoughts.

For example, the premises of an argument "determine"

the conclusion and previous waking experience "determine" the content

3

of dreams

.

In the former case determination
proceeds according to

logical principles
but he applies

,

in the latter according to "laws of
association,"

determination" in the same sense to both

(

5

.

217 ).

Finally, note that Question One concerns how we
could know that we have

intuitions and not whether we have them.

The latter issue Peirce takes

up in Question Seven.
Peirce answers Question One in the negative.

"There is," he asserts

no evidence that we have this faculty except that we seem
to feel that

we have it" (5.21U).

But as he points out, to rely on such a feeling

presupposes that we have just the sort of intuitive power whose
existence
is in question:

that is, that we can tell intuitively whether a cog-

nition has been determined by other cognitions.

To accept such evidence,

then, would be to prejudge the answer to Question One.

Further, Peirce

offers several reasons for believing that we do not possess the intuitive

faculty under discussion.

First, he supposes that, if we had such a

power, there should be considerable agreement about which sorts of

cognitions are intuitive.

He contends that a survey of intellectual

history and contemporary opinion reveals no such consensus

(5. 215).

Second, he argues that everyday experience with eye-witness testimony
shows that people have great difficulty "distinguishing what they have

seen from what they have inferred"

(

5

-

2 l 6 ).

Finally, he adduces a

number of instances in which, he maintains, knowledge once thought
intuitive has been shown to be determined by other cognitions.

He

mentions, among other cases, judgments concerning an object's position
in three dimensional space and concerning the pitch of a tone (5-219-

It

•233).

Considering all the evidence, Peirce concludes,
one should

reject the claim that we can tell intuitively
whether a given cognition
has been determined by some other.

Peirce uses the above conclusion to block appeals to
intuition in
the discussion of later questions.

In addition, his remarks in Question

One have a more general significance.

knowledge of our

mere conception

own.

—

He will later argue that our

existence, our ability to distinguish belief from

indeed, all our knowledge of our own mental states

depends upon inference.

—

He recognizes that these contentions seem

contrary to our experience, for we do not feel that such knowledge
involves inference.

He wants to establish, therefore, that we cannot

reasonably rely on such feelings in ascertaining whether a given bit of

knowledge is intuitive or inferential.
Question Two
ness

:

Whether we have an intuitive self-conscious-

.

Peirce explains what he means by "self-consciousness" as follows:
Self-consciousness, as the term is here used, is to be
distinguished from consciousness generally, from the
internal sense and from pure apperception. Any cognition is
a consciousness of the object as represented; by self-consciousness is meant a knowledge of ourselves. Wot a mere
feeling of the subjective conditions of consciousness,
but of our personal selves. Pure apperception is the
self-assertion of THE EGO the self-consciousness here
meant is the recognition of my private self. I know that
I (not merely the l) exist. The question is, how do I
know it; by a special intuitive faculty, or is it determined
by previous cognitions?
(5.225)
;

Question One establishes that we cannot know intuitively that we
have intuitive self-consciousness.

"Therefore," Peirce says, "the

5

existence or non-existence of this power is to he
determined upon evidence and the question is whether self-consciousness
can be explained by

the action of known faculties under conditions known
to exist "or

whether we must postulate an "intuitive faculty of
self-consciousness"
(5*226).

He argues that we can account for our knowledge of
our private

selves without postulating with a faculty

.

His account of how we might

get such knowledge by inference deserves a detailed treatment.

I

am

concerned, however, with his critique of introspection rather than
his

positive views on first-person psychological knowledge.
reason, I shall simply refer the reader to Question Two

Peirce's account.

For that
5.

229 -. 236 for

Peirce's critical views on intuitive self-conscious-

ness are the topic of Chapter V.

Question Three

:

Whether we have an intuitive power of

distinguishing between the subjective elements of
different kinds of cognitions.

Peirce explains as follows
Every cognition involves something represented, or
that of which we are conscious, and some action or
passion of the self whereby it becomes represented.
The former may be termed the objective, the latter
the subjective element of the cognition. ...
It
is possible that ... an intuition of the subjective
element of a cognition, of its character, whether
that of dreaming, imagining, conceiving, believing,
etc., should accompany every cognition. The question
is whether this is so.
5 238 )
(

.

The question, then, is whether one can know intuitively in what
sort of cognition one is engaged:

whether one perceives or merely

6

imagines something, whether one fully
accepts or simply entertains a

proposition.

Peirce denies that we need postulate any
intuitive faculty

in order to explain our ability to
distinguish these states.

Perceiving

and imagining, he claims, may be distinguished
by references to differences
in their "immediate objects" (5-24l).

not prepared to say.

two ways:

(l)

Just what he means by this

I

am

Believing and conceiving may be distinguished in

A "peculiar feeling of cognition" accompanies
belief

and, therefore, one can identify belief by noting
the presence of this

feeling; (2)

hence

,

A belief is "that judgment from which a man will
act" and,

one may ascertain whether one believes or merely conceives
that

something is the case by seeing whether one will act on the
thought in
question should the opportunity arise (5-242).

Thus, Peirce maintains,

we can explain our ability to distinguish among these sorts of cognitions
without having recourse to talk about an intuitive power of recognizing
such distinctions.
The foregoing remarks set the scene for the examination of Question
Four.

I

shall not explain in detail or defend Peirce's treatment of the

earlier questions.

Certain issues raised in those questions will reappear

in later discussion, however, and

Question Four

:

I

shall deal with them as they arise.

Whether we have any power of introspection

or whether our whole knowledge of the internal world is

derived from observation of external facts.
Peirce opens his comments on Question Four with a disclaimer.
It is not intended here to assume the reality of
the external world. Only, there is a certain
set of facts which are ordinarily regarded as
external, while others are regarded as internal.
The question is whether the latter are known
otherwise than by inference from the former. (5-244)

7

The above comments introduce a cluster of
problems that go un-

resolved

m

"Questions."

It will appear, as Peirce develops his
argu-

ment in Question Four, that the "external facts"
from which knowledge of
the internal world is supposed to derive are neither
external nor factual.
Problems concerning their status as facts are best
discussed elsewhere
(See Chapter II). The problem of their externality
comes to the fore in

the passage quoted.

Peirce makes clear that the facts he has in mind

are not necessarily facts about an external world.

however, what makes these facts external facts:

He does not explain,

unless the explanation

is that they are external simply because they are ordinarily
so regarded.

This explanation merely invites the further question,
fact to be regarded as external?

5

'

What is it for a

In order to explain Peirce's notion of

externality and to answer the numerous questions about external facts
left unresolved in Question Four, one must look to his later works.

shall consider his account of externality in Chapter V.

I

For the present,

problems about external fact will be left hanging.

Following his opening disclaimer, Peirce explains what he means by
introspection
By introspection I mean a direct perception of
the internal world, but not necessarily a perception
of it as_ internal.
Nor do I mean to limit the
signification of the word to intuition, but would
extend it to any knowledge of the internal world
not derived from external observation. (5.2UU)

This passage offers two different characterizations of

introspection.

According to the first, introspection involves a direct

perception, or knowledge by direct perception, of things internal.

In

8

the second, introspection includes any
knowledge of the internal world
not derived from external observation.

Thus, for example, knowledge of

the internal world derived by inference
from internal facts comes under
the second characterization of introspection,
but not the first.

Peirce

addresses his argument in Question Four to the second,
broader conception
of introspection.
One should note that Peirce does not restrict
introspection to

knowledge of the mental as mental.

Question Pour concerns "our whole

knowledge of the internal world" and one may have knowledge
of a mental

phenomenon without recognizing that it is mental.
explicit in 5.2UU:

He makes this fairly

"By introspection I mean a direct perception of the

internal world, hut not necessarily a perception of it as internal."
draw attention to this point for two reasons.

I

First, in his later works

Peirce does restrict introspection to knowledge of the internal as
internal (See Chapter V

)

Second, two of his commentators, Justus

„

Buchler and Thomas Goudge

,

treat the argument in Question Four as though

it deals only with knowledge of the internal as internal.

Buchler, for

example, interprets Peirce's claim that we have no power of introspec-

tion as follows:

"Thus, neither the self nor its cognitions considered

as mental activities or processes is known intuitively." 2

This may be

an accurate reading of Peirce's later conclusions about introspection,

but it misconstrues his intentions in Question Four.

p

p. 13.

Justus Buchler, Charles Peirce's Empiricism
See also, Thomas Goudge, The Thought of C

1950, p. 232.

.

.

S

New York, 1939,
Peirce Toronto,
.

,

9

Peirce argues that we have no power of introspection

,

that our

whole knowledge of the internal world derives from external observation.
To make his case, he considers three sorts of knowledge of the inner world

and attempts to show that each derives from external facts. He first

discusses knowledge of sensations.
There is one sense in which any perception has an
internal object, namely, that every sensation is
partly determined by internal conditions. Thus,
the sensation of redness is as it is owing to the
constitution of the mind; and in this sense it is
a sensation of something internal.
Hence, we may
derive knowledge of the mind from a consideration
of this sensation, but that knowledge would, in
fact, be an inference from redness as a predicate
of something external. (5-2^5)
,

This passage is too brief and too vague to be very helpful. Peirce
does not tell us what knowledge of mind the subject derives from con-

sidering a sensation of redness; knowledge of the quality redness; the

knowledge that he is having a sensation, or the knowledge that his
sensation is, in a sense, "a sensation of something internal."

Nor is

it clear from what external facts the subject derives knowledge of mind.
Is it the fact that some external thing presents itself to him?

W. B.

Gallie suggests that Peirce's argument has something to do with the
claim that the predicate "red" applies primarily to external objects and
only derivatively to sensations.

3

Whether or not Gallie is correct, it

requires considerable interpretation to extract the doctine he suggests
from

5

.

2^5

.

Finally, Peirce does not say how the subject derives

knowledge of mind from a consideration of the sensation in question.

3

W.

B.

Gallie, Peirce and Pragmatism

.

New York, 1966

,

p.

68.

10

Perhaps such knowledge arises from the
discovery that "the sensation of

redness is as it is owing to the constitution
of the mind."

In any

case, Peirce has a lot of explaining to do.

The next example receives a fuller discussion.

—

There are certain other feelings
the emotions,
for example
which appear to arise in the first
place, not as predicates at all, and to be
referable
to the mind alone.
It would seem, then, that by
means of these, a knowledge of the mind may be
obtained, which is not inferred from any character
of outward things
The question is whether this is
really so. (5.2U5) 4

—

.

5

.

2U7

.

In reference to the above argument

.

.

.,

it must be admitted that if a man is angry, his
anger implies in general, no determinant and
constant character in its object. But, on the
other hand, it can hardly be questioned that there
is some relative character in the outward thing

which makes him angry and a little reflection will
serve to show that his anger consists in his saying
to himself , "this thing is vile, abominable, etc."
and that it is rather a mark of returning to reason
to say, "I am angry." In the same way any emotion
is a predication concerning some object, and the chief
difference between this and an objective intellectual
judgment is that while the latter is relative to human
nature or to mind in general, the former is relative
to the particular circumstances and dispositions of
a particular man at a particular time.
The passages quoted above seem to reveal the outline of an argument.

Peirce begins with an account of the nature of the emotions.

Whenever the subject is angry, for example, "there is some relative

*5-2^6 contains an argument to the effect that we cannot know
intuitively that we possess a power of introspection. This conclusion,
Peirce maintains, follows from his argument under Question Three that
"we have no intuitive faculty of distinguishing different subjective
modes of consciousness."

11

character in the outward thing that makes him angry" and
his anger
consists in his judging that some external thing has a
certain quality.
This description of anger seems to he a particular
application of

general view.

a

'more

In Question Two, for example, Peirce remarks:

Wo one questions that when a sound is first
heard hy a child, he thinks, not of himself as
hearing, hut of the hell or other object as
sounding.
How when he wills to move the table?
Does he think of himself as desiring, or only of
the table as fit to he moved? That he has the
latter thought is beyond question.
(5.230)
,

.

.

.

Apparently Peirce holds that our unreflective experience of our own

mental states is an experience of what are, or what we take to he,
qualities of outward objects.

Further, it seems that the external facts from which the subject
derives knowledge of his emotions are facts stated by such judgments as
’This thing is vile':

that is, the unreflective judgments concerning

external objects which the subject makes whenever he is in an emotional
state express the external facts from which he infers that he is in the
state in question.

Peirce does not explain how one gets from the judg-

ment that something is vile to the conclusion that one is angry.

Perhaps,

this inference involves the discovery that one’s judgment that something
is vile, unlike one’s "objective intellectual judgments," somehow depends

upon one's particular dispositions and circumstances.

However he accounts

for the derivation, Peirce does suggest that the path to knowledge of

one's own emotional states originates in judgments concerning "relative"

characteristics of external objects.

Looking back to

to be what he is saying about sensations as well.

5

-2^5, th is seems

12

Although

I

shall not attempt to work out the argument
sketched

above until Chapter II, it is instructive to
compare the passages just

discussed with W. B. Gallie's account of Peirce’s argument
in Question
Four.

According to Gallie, Peirce maintains that all our
knowledge of

our own minds "is derived from our knowledge of certain
’outward'

physical facts:

namely

.

.

.

parts or results of our own

.

.

.

behavior." 5

Clearly, neither Peirce’s discussion of sensation nor his
remarks on the

emotions make any reference to behavior.

This is not to say that he

never suggests that one may infer knowledge of one’s inner world
from
facts about one’s behavior.

The discussion of belief in Question Three,

5.242, might bear such interpretation.

External facts concerning one's

behavior have no special place in the argument of Question Four, however.
Following his account of the emotions, Peirce adds a brief and very
obscure section on volition.
5.248.
It remains then to inquire whether it is
necessary to suppose a particular power of introspection for the sense of willing. Now, volition,
as distinguished from desire, is nothing but a power
of concentrating the attention, of abstracting.
Hence,
the knowledge of the power of abstracting may be
inferred from abstract objects, just as knowledge
6f the power of seeing is inferred from colored
obj ects

The treatment of volition in 5.248
has gone before.

does not fit neatly with what

What are the external facts in this case?

That some

abstract object exists seems a doubtful candidate for the designation
"external fact."

Furthermore, it is by no means clear what an abstract

object is supposed to be, nor how one recognizes the difference between

5

Ibid.

,

p.

80.

13

abstract and non-abstract objects. Nor is the analogy with
color-

perception informative. Is the power of abstracting a power of perceiving features of external objects or a power of creating abstract
objects?

Finally, the identification of volition and the power of

concentrating the attention or of abstracting seems flatly mistaken.
Peirce's remarks on the power of abstracting in "Some Consequences
of Four Incapacities" may help to untangle the passage in Question Four.

There he says that, when one exercises the power of abstraction, "an
emphasis is put upon one of the objective elements of a cognition"
(5-295)-

When one abstracts from a perception, for example, one puts an

emphasis on a certain feature of what one perceives, its color or its
shape, perhaps. One might suppose that such emphasis has the effect of

making the feature attended to seem particularly prominent relative to
the other characteristics of the object perceived.

If so, one might

infer that one is exercising the power of abstraction from the fact that
the color, say, of a given object is unusually prominent.

I

shall not

attempt to defend this account of abstraction, but it does indicate how

Peirce might have been led to suppose that there is some external fact
i.e., that fact that some feature of an object is unusually prominent

relative to its other features, associated with the power of abstraction.

Clearly it fails to explain why he identifies volition with the

power of abstraction and it offers no way of supplying external facts

corresponding to those instances of volition which concern things not
present, e.g., willing that one perform some future act.

14

It appears that one must turn to the
discussion of emotion in

5.247 in order to discover the nature of
Peirce's argument that our whole

knowledge of the internal world derives from
external observation.
shall examine that discussion minutely in Chapter
II.

I

The foregoing

account, however, indicates what Peirce must do
to make good on the

suggestions in 5.247.

He must explain the doctrine concerning our

experience of our mental states presupposed in that passage
and he must
trace a route from that doctrine to his conclusions
about our knowledge
of the internal world.

CHAPTER

II

THE ARGUMENT OF QUESTION FOUR
To do justice to the argument in
Question Four one must consider

Peirce

later writings as veil as his remarks
in "Questions."

s

I

shall

begin by examining his comments on
knowledge of the emotions in "Questions"
5.2^7.

In 5.247 he prepounds the thesis
that "any emotion is a predica-

tion concerning some object."
"Questions

writings.

,

He does not explain this doctrine in

"

but he presents it at greater length in
certain later

I

shall work out the details of his view by
reference to his

later discussion, and then ask whether the
doctrine that every emotion
involves a predication concerning some object is
plausible in its own
right and whether this thesis has the epistemological
consequences

Peirce ascribes to it.
he claims that

The latter question turns on what he means when

our whole knowledge of the internal world is derived

from the observation of external facts."

I

shall argue that this claim

is incompatible with the G’artesian tradition only if it
concerns the

justification of beliefs about the internal world.

If it is so inter-

preted, Peirce's discussion of the emotions provides no reason to suppose
that one's knowledge of one's own emotional states derives from external
facts.

This result shows that his argument in Question Four fails to

establish that we have no power of introspection.

15
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Another look at Question Four
If there is an argument in
"Questions" for the conclusion that our

knowledge of the internal world derives
from external observation, it
must be extracted from the three examples
Peirce discusses in
5. 2^

7

and 5.248.

5 . 2U 5

,

In view of the brevity of the first and
the obscurity

of the third example, his comments on the
emotions in 5.247 must bear
the weight of the argument.

I

quote again the crucial section of that

passage
I1: must b e admitted that if
a man is angry,
his anger implies, in general, no determinant
and
constant character in its object. But, on the other
hand, it can hardly be questioned that there is
some
relative character in the outward thing which makes
him angry and a little reflection will serve to
show that his anger consists in his saying to himself,
"this thing is vile, abominable, etc." and that it is'
rather a mark of returning to reason to say, "I am
^-ng^y*
In the same way any emotion is a predication
concerning some object, and the chief difference between
this and an objective intellectual judgment is that
while the latter is relative to human nature or to mind
in general, the former is relative to the particular
circumstances and disposition of a particular man at a
particular time. V/hat is here said of emotions in
general, is true in particular of the sense of beauty
&nd of the moral sense.
Good and bad are feelings which
first arise as predicates, and therefore are either
predicates of the not—I , or are determined by previous
cognitions (there being no intuitive power of distinguishing subjective elements of consciousness).
•

,

According to the above account, whenever the subject is angry,
there is some relative character of an outward thing which makes him
angry.

Further, the subject's anger consists in his judging that

something, perhaps the outward thing whose character makes him angry,
is vile,

for example.

Finally, Peirce suggests that one only recog-

nizes that one is angry upon reflection.

IT

The foregoing remarks should point toward
some argument
for the conclusion that the subject's
knowledge that he is angry derives

by inference from external facts.

In order to determine what argument

Peirce intends here, one must first decide from
which external facts he
seeks to derive knowledge of the emotions.

two candidates:

The passage quoted offers

the fact that some relative character of an
outward

thing causes the subject to become angry and the
fact that something is
vile.

The former will not serve for Peirce's argument
since, if the

subject knows that some outward thing is making him angry,
he knows
all eady that he is angry and it is this knowledge whose
derivation

Peirce wants to explain.

Perhaps some general truth about the causal

powers of external things provides the relevant external fact.

For

example, the relevant external fact might be that objects having a

certain sort of relative character usually cause people to get angry.
One need not know that one is now angry in order to know this general
truth.
(1)

However, this line of attack appears unpromising for two reasons:

The most obvious explanation of how the general truth in question

could come to be known involves the supposition that people can recognize
that they are angry without knowledge of this general truth, i.e., they

note that they become angry on certain occasions and test various hypothese

concerning the causes of their anger.

Here the discovery of anger pre-

dates discovery of its causal explanation.

It may be that this

'obvious'

explanation is wrong, but, if so, Peirce would need to expose its errors.
(2)

It seems clear that people occasionally become angry under conditions

which do not usually produce anger.

In such cases, the object respon-
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sible for one’s anger would not be an
object of a sort which usually
causes anger.

Thus, no external fact of the appropriate
sort would be

available in these instances

A further problem with the above approach is
that it takes no
account of the judgmental element of emotions.

Peirce seems to think it

important that "any emotion is a predication
concerning some object."

Emphasizing this portion of his account, one might
suppose that the
external facts from which knowledge of anger is derived
are facts

expressed by such judgments as "This thing is vile."

One might object

here that something’s being vile is a strange sort of thing
to regard as
an external fact.

Indeed, one should note that the claim that anger

consists in saying to oneself "This thing is vile," etc., has in
itself
no connection with the view that anger is always caused by some
charac-

ter of an outward object.

The judgmental account of emotion could be

true even if there were no external objects.

In view of Peirce's

reluctance to commit himself to the reality of an external world,

however, the foregoing remarks do not establish that he would deny that
"This thing is vile" states what is "ordinarily regarded" as an external
fact (see 5.2hk).

His comparison between emotional predications and

"objective intellectual judgments" may be intended to show that the
former have as much right to be regarded as statements about externals
as the latter.

Emotional predicates differ

from,

objective judgments,

not in being relative to mind, but in being relative to particular minds

rather than to "mind in general" (5.2kj).
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That Peirce mentions no other sorts of
judgments than those rep-

resented by 'This thing is vile' further supports
the contention that it
is such judgments which state the
relevant external facts.

To derive

knowledge of the internal world is, presumably,
to infer statements
about that world from other statements.
in inferences.

Statements, not facts, figure

The only statements about externals mentioned
in

5. 2*47

are those attributing some relative character, e,g.,
vileness (and,

later in the passage, goodness and beauty) to external
objects.

Although
Peirce
Four,
fact.

s

I

I

believe that the above suggestion accurately represents

intentions regarding the external facts mentioned in Question
agree that something's being vile is a strange sort of external

To go more deeply into this problem requires an examination of

his general views on internality and externality

.

Such an examination

must wait until Chapter V.

Supposing that 'This thing is vile' expresses an external fact, why
does Peirce believe that one infers that one is angry from such state-

ments of external fact?

As

I

noted in Chapter I, his contention seems

to depend, at least in part, on some theory concerning our experience of

our own emotional states.

To see just what theory he has in mind requires

considerable effort.
In Question Four Peirce says that the subject's anger "consists in

his saying to himself 'This thing is vile, abominable,' etc."

Further

he maintains that "in the same way any emotion is a predication concerning

some object" (5.2^7).

These statements represent applications of a

general thesis which crops up elsewhere in "Questions." Under Question
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Two

,

5-2^0, he writes:
No. one questions that, when a sound is
heard by a
child, he thinks, not of himself as hearing,
but of
the bell or other object as sounding. How
when he

wills. to move the table? Does he think of
himself as
desiring, or only of the table as fit to be
moved?
That he has the latter thought is beyond
question.
.

The view indicated above, which

I

shall call The Externalization

Thesis (ET), receives its most detailed expression
in Peirce's post-1900
works
In a certain sense, there is such 3, thing as introspection; but it consists in an interpretation of
phenomena presenting themselves as external percepts.
We first see red and blue things
It is quite a
discovery when we find the eye has anything to do
with them, and a discovery still more recondite when
we learn that there is an ego behind the eye to
which these qualities properly belong.
8 1UU ,
"Pearson’s Grammar of Science
a review published in
1901.)
.

,

(

.

Everything in the psychical sciences is inferential.
Not the smallest fact about the mind can be
directly perceived as psychical. An emotion is directly
felt as a bodily state, or else it is known only
inferentially
That a thing is agreeable appears to
direct observation as a character of an object, and
it is only by inference that it is referred to the
mind.
Minute Logic circa 1902, unpublished.)
(1.250,
.

.

.

.

,

I think it is probably true that every element of
experience is in the first instance attributed to an
external object. A man who gets up out of the wrong
side of the bed, for example, attributed wrongness to
almost every object he perceives. That is the way in
which he experiences his bad temper.
(1.335, "Phaneroscopy or the Natural History of Concepts," circa
1905 .)

It is, however, a patent fact that we never, in the
first instance, attribute a quality of feeling to
ourselves. We first attribute it to a Non-ego and

only come to attribute it to ourselves when irrefragable reasons compel us to do so.
(5-57, Lectures
on Pragmatism 1903,

21

Ignoring certain questions for the moment,
the view expressed above

would seem to amount to the following:
(1)

When, in the first instance, the subject
experiences some

quality of feeling,

*1

he attributes it to an external object,

i.e., judges that it is a quality of an
external object.
(2)

The subject’s experience of his own internal
states and activities is /in the first instance?7

an experience of qualities

of feeling.
(3)

Thus, when the subject experiences his own internal
states he

experiences certain qualities of feeling which, in the first
instance, he tahes to be qualities of external objects.
(3) will serve as a statement of the Externalization Thesis.

It is worth noticing one difference between ET as expressed in
the

post-1900 passages and the view Peirce seems to adopt in Question Four.
Introducing a bit of philosophical jargon, one might say that the thesis

summarized in (3) above may be read de dicto or

de_

re

.

On the de dicto

reading, (3) asserts merely that the subject judges or believes that
some external object has a certain quality.

Given a de

re_

interpretation,

(3) would imply that there exists some external object to which the

subject attributes the quality in question.

Thus, one who adopts ET in

"Quality of feeling" is a bit of standard Peircean terminology.
It covers any quality presented to the subject in that mode of
consciousness Peirce calls "Feeling". Included here are sensory

qualities and, apparently, moral and aesthetic qualities such
as goodness, wrongness, and beauty (See 5-2^7 and 1.335).
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its de re interpretation commits himself to the
claim that, in order for

the subject to experience his own emotional state,
some external object

must exist: on its de di et o reading the thesis involves
no such commitment; it asserts only that the subject has a certain belief.

Nothing in

the post-1900 statements of ET forces Peirce to adopt the
de re inter-

pretation.

His remarks in 5-2^7, however, strongly suggest that,
whenever

the subject is angry, there is some outward thing which the subject

takes to be vile.
claim that

This suggestion arises from the juxtaposition of the

if a man is angry

.

.

.

there is some relative character in

the outward thing which makes him angry," and the contention that, "a

little reflection will serve to show that his anger consists in his
saying to himself, ‘This thing is vile'."

A natural reading of the

above would be that the subject judges of the outward thing which makes

him angry that it has the relative character vileness

,

in which case

the subject cannot be angry unless there is an outward thing that
he regards as vile. Perhaps, then, there are textual grounds for pre-

ferring a

de_ re_

formulation of ET

.

But, as we shall see, such a reading

renders that thesis highly improbable.

Another question of interpretation concerns the qualifying phrase
"in the first instance" included in the statement of ET.

says, in

5

•

57

9

When Peirce

that "we never, in the first instance, attribute a quality

of feeling to ourselves," his comment may be taken in two ways:

(a)

whenever the subject encounters an instance of some quality of feeling,
he attributes that instance of the quality to some external thing and he
can attribute the quality-instance in question to himself only when

"irrefragable reasons" compel him to do so, or (b) at some early stage
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m

the subject's intellectual development, he
attributes all instances

of qualities of feeling to external things.

The second alternative

leaves open the possibility that the subject may
later acquire a degree
of sophistication which allows him to attribute
qualities of feeling to

himself without first ascribing them to externals.

As before, the

decision between these alternative interpretations affects
the plausi-

bility of ET, but

I

find nothing in the statements of that thesis which

forces one or the other reading.

Putting interpretive questions aside for the moment, let us ask
what reasons Peirce advances in support of ET

controversial claims:

.

That thesis involves two

the claim that, in the first instance, the subject

attributes qualities of feeling to external objects, and the view that
the subject's experience of his own mental states is merely an experience

of certain qualities of feeling.

In order to evaluate this latter

contention one must consider Peirce's argument that we do not directly
perceive our own mental operations.

Since that argument will be dis-

cussed in Chapter IV, let us concede his point for the present and focus
on the argument for the first claim.

Peirce seems to include, or at least to indicate, an argument for
the initial attribution of qualities of feeling to externals in

5

-

2UT

"Good and bad are feelings which first arise as predicates, and therefore
are either predicates of the not-I, or are determined by previous cognitions
(there being no intuitive power of distinguishing subjective elements of

consciousness)."

The parenthetical remark may refer back to the argument

in Question Three where he asserts that we have no "intuitive power of

2h

distinguishing between the subjective elements of different kinds of
cognitions

(5 -237)

•

It is difficult to see, however, what Question

Three has to do with the point at issue. It concerns this subject's

ability to discriminate among different kinds of internal states, not
his ability to tell whether a quality belongs to the

I

or the not-I.

More probably the enclosed comment refers the reader to Quation Two,
"whether we have an intuitive self-consciousness."

There Peirce maintains,

for example, that when a child hears a sound, the child thinks of some

object as sounding rather than of itself as hearing (5.230).

Interpreted

in the way just suggested, the comment within the parentheses asserts

that the subject has no intuitive power of distinguishing the subjective,

those things belonging to his inner world, from the objective, those

belonging to the outer one.
Certain remarks in "issues of Pragmaticism" (1905) lend credence to
the interpretation suggested above.

Introspection is wholly a matter of inference.
One is immediately conscious of Feelings no
doubt ; but not that that they are feelings of
The self is only inferred. There is
an ego
no time in the present for any inference.
Consequently the present object must be an external
object, if there be any objective reference it
it. ( 5 .U 62 )
,

.

.

.

.

It seems reasonable to suppose that Peirce has comething like the above

argument in mind in Question Four as well.
What of this argument then?

First, it presupposes that "feelings"

(by which, I take it, Peirce means "qualities of feeling") must be

attributed either to the ego or to the non-ego.

Peirce then asks

whether, at the moment when it first appears in conscious, the subject
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can attribute a quality of feeling
to the ego.

He rules out this

suggestion on the grounds that the self,
or ego, must be inferred and
that there is no time in the present to
carry out such an inference.
Therefore, he concludes, when a quality of feeling
first enters the
subject's consciousness, the subject must ascribe
it to the external

world, the non-ego.
The argument developed above has two important
shortcomings.

First,

it is not clear what Peirce means when he says,
"The self is only

inferred.

If he means that the subject can obtain knowledge
of the

self only by inference, his point is not relevant to the
argument in

question.

ihe subject need not have knowledge of the ego in order to

attribute a quality of feeling to himself, he need only believe in the
ego.

The issue is not whether the subject knows that a quality of

feeling belongs to his inner world, but whether he takes it to belong
to that world.

Thus, Peirce must hold that belief in the self arises by

inference, if his argument is to go through.

Actually, the argument may require an even stronger assertion.

It

seems to suppose that, each time a quality of feeling presents itself to

the subject, he must run through an inference resulting in belief in the
self, if he is to attribute this quality to himself.

counter-intuitive.

This claim is

Presumably, once the subject arrives at belief in

the self, he can later employ this belief without having to re-establish
it on every occasion of its use.

Even if he originally comes to have

this belief by inference, there is no reason to suppose that he must

26

report that inference whenever he assigns a quality
of feeling to his

inner world.

Peirce might get around the problem raised above by
restricting
the claim that qualities of feeling are initially
referred to the nonego.

He could argue, as he does in Question Two,

5-

227- .23^

,

that we

acquire a belief in the self long after our first experiences
of qualities of feeling and that, until we acquire this belief, we
attribute all
such qualities to the external world.

Further, he might add, we come to

have the concept of a self only by a process of inference.
in

5 .H 62

The argument

would explain, then, why we do not ascribe qualities of feeling

to the self from the moment of our intellectual awakening.

To adopt

this strategy requires a corresponding restriction on the Externalization

Thesis itself:

a restriction such as the one discussed earlier in my

remarks concerning the interpretation of the phrase "in the first instance"
in the statement of ET

.

Further, Peirce must show that we acquire a

belief in external things, the non-ego, before we acquire a belief in
the ego.

But, this latter demonstration is required for the success of

the original argument in 5.462 as well.

Perhaps, then, he can avoid the

first objection to that argument at no additional cost.

The second shortcoming of the argument in 5-462 appears when one
considers whether belief in the non-ego is temporally prior to belief in
the ego in human intellectual development.

Peirce supposes that

qualities of feeling must be attributed either to the ego or to the
non-ego.

He does not say why this is so.

It seems possible that the

subject should initially attribute qualities of feeling to neither.

One
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must not confuse the claim that any quality
is a quality either of
the ego or of the non-ego, i.e., of something
not identical with the
ego, with the assertion that the subject
must ascribe any given quality

to one or the other.

The categories 'ego' and 'non-ego' are exhaustive

inasmuch as any quality belonging to a thing must
belong to a thing in
one of the two categories.

But, in assigning location to qualities of

feeling, the subject need not employ these categories.

He need not

believe either that a given quality belongs to the ego or
that it is a
feature of the non-ego.

Thus, Peirce is not entitled to move from the

premise that the subject cannot initially attribute a present quality
O-f*

feeling to the ego, to the conclusion that the subject must then

attribute that quality to the non-ego.
the argument in

5 .U 62

For this reason, if for no other

lends no credibility to the Externalization Thesis

The failure of the argument discussed above is not disastrous for
ET.

That thesis is probably best regarded as an empirical claim to be

tested by methods appropriate to developmental psychology rather than as
a conclusion necessitated by general philosophical considerations.

any case,

I

In

shall now turn from considering why Peirce accepts ET to

examine its role in the argument of Question Four.

The critique of introspection and the Externalization Thesis

The argument of Question Four seems to rely on the Externalization

Thesis.

To show that a man's knowledge that he is angry derives from

observation of external facts, Peirce apparently thinks it sufficient to
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point out that "there is some relative
character in the outward thing

which makes him angry, and a little
reflection will serve to show that
his anger consists in his saying to
himself, 'This thing is vile,

abominable, etc.,'.

.

."

(5.1*2?)

.

One must inquire, then, whether ET

has the epistemological consequences
Peirce attributes it.

A general picture of our attainment of
inner knowledge emerges from
the discussion of ET.

external objects.
statements.")

We start with judgments ascribing qualities
to

(I shall

hereafter refer to such judgments as "external

These external judgments, ’This thing is vile,'
for

example, express our original experience of our
own internal states.

Somehow we get from this externalized experience to
the knowledge that
there is an internal world and to the knowledge that
specific qualities
and activities belong to it.

Peirce summarizes the above account in his

review of Karl Pearson's Grammar of Science

,

1901.

We have to set out upon our intellectual
travels from the home where we already find
ourselves. ... It is the external world that
we directly observe. What passes within we know
only as it is mirrored in external objects.
In
a certain sense, there is such a thing as introspection, but it consists in the interpretation
of phenomena presenting themselves as external
percepts, we first see red and blue things. It
is quite a discovery when we find the eye has
anything to do with them, and a discovery still
recondite when we learn that there is an ego
behind the eye, to which these qualities properly
belong. (6.1UU)
.

o

.

Just how, according to Peirce, we get from external ’percepts’

to knowledge of what lies 'behind the eye’ is a question
explore.

I

shall later

But, if one grants him the Externalization Thesis, it seems
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tempting to suppose that such knowledge
originates in, or derives from,
external judgments.
To see whether this supposition is
reasonable, one must carefully

examine Peirce's claim that inner knowledge
derives from external statements.

I

suggested earlier that this claim involves, at
a minimum, the

contention that the subject infers internal statements * 2
from external
ones.

This account leaves an important question unanswered,
however:

Do such inferences merely explain how the subject
comes to have certain

beliefs about his internal world, or do they justify
those beliefs?
It is worth spending some time to get clear about
the alternatives

mentioned.

In The_ Nature of Things

,

Anthony Quinton draws a convenient

distinction between coming to believe by inference and coming to
know

by inference.

He points out that in some cases one first comes to a

particular belief as a result of having inferred it from some premises.
For example, I may come to believe that Jones is a thief after discovering stolen property in his possession and inferring that he acquired

this property by theft.

may not justify it:

My inference leads to my belief, but it may or

my reasoning may be invalid,

in accepting its premises.

I

may not be warranted

On the other hand, an inference may justify

*2

By "internal statements" I mean either statements explicitly
asserting that something is mental, belongs to the internal world, or
statements in which the speaker ascribes a particular internal state
to himself, e.g., 'I am angry.' Statements of the latter sort do not
presuppose that the speaker takes the state in question to be an
internal state.

^Anthony Quinton, The Nature of Things

.

London, 1973, p. 189.
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one of my beliefs even though

I

did not come to have the belief in

question as a result of carrying out that
inference.

Thus,

I

may form

the opinion that Jones is a thief out of
some prejudice against him and

acquire justification for the opinion only after
having run through an

appropriate bit of reasoning.

Supposing that Jones is guilty, my

reasoning results in my coming to know that he is a
thief, but it does
not account for my coming to believe that he is.

Since Peirce says that we derive knowledge of the
internal world by

inferences from external facts, he presumably holds that
such inferences

justify our beliefs about internals, rather than merely
explain why we
have those beliefs.
the argument of

justification

—

Furthermore, if Peirce aims to refute Cartesianism

Question Four

should concern coming to know

and not merely coming to believe.

Descartes offers no

special account of how we come by our beliefs about the internal world.
Indeed, in the Second Meditation, he suggests that they are acquired

haphazardly and get rather mixed up with beliefs about the external
.

world.

k

What he proposes to explain is how such beliefs are justified

.

Quite appropriately, he would not be moved by a view which holds merely
that we come to have beliefs about internal phenomena as a result of

inference from external statements.

He could grant that position and

continue to insist that reasoning from external statements has no part
in the justification of our beliefs about the internal world.

Peirce

fails to come to grips with the Cartesian tradition if he seeks to

establish only the derivation of beliefs.

Rene Descartes Philosophical Writings edited and translated
by G. E. M. Anscombe and P. T. Geach. New York, 1971,

,
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have emphasized the distinction
between coming to know by inference and coming to believe by
inference in order to make clear what
Peirce needs to show by the argument
of Question Four.
He must show
I

that those beliefs which constitute
our knowledge of the inner world
are

justified by inference from external statements.

It does not suffice to

establish that we arrive at those beliefs by
processes of reasoning

which begin with external statements.

ET

,

if correct, probably does

provide good reason to accept some such assertion.
do more.

But, Peirce needs to

If ET is to provide an argument for the
conclusion that our

knowledge of the internal world derives by inferences
from external
statements, he must show that ET gives us good reason
to suppose that

inferences from external statements play an essential
role in the

justification of our beliefs about the inner world.
Keeping the above considerations in mind, let us return our
attention
to Peirce’s argument in 5-21*7 that one’s knowledge that one
is angry

derives by inference from the fact that some external thing is vile.
This argument presupposes a stronger version of ET than is required
by
his later statements of that thesis.

His claim bhat being angry ’’consists

in" judging that something is vile implies that one attributes vileness
to something external whenever one is angry.

As

I

pointed out, the

later statements of ET may require only that such judgment accompany
anger at some stage in the subject's intellectual development.

Like-

wise, the discussion in 5-21*7 suggests that, when the sugject is angry,

there is some external thing to which he ascribes vileness and not

merely that the subject makes a certain sort of judgment.

Thus, the
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version of ET at work in 5-2^7 is what

I

have called the de re

interpretation of ET
In the strong version employed in
5-2^7, ET faces serious diffi-

culties.

I

may he angry because

I

believe that someone has stolen my

wallet and yet not believe of anyone in particular
that he is the thief.
Peirce might maintain that in the sort of case described,
the subject
ascribes vileness to an external situation or event, e.g.,
my wallet's

having been stolen, rather than to a person.

But, an event of the

appropriate sort may likewise fail to occur.

I

may be angry in the

belief that my wallet has been stolen, even though

I

have merely lost my

wallet and no theft has taken place.
The objection above assumes that the thing which the subject thinks

vile is the thing toward which he directs his anger, the so-called

intentional object of his anger.

by arguing that

,

although there is always some external thing which

seems vile to me when

object of my anger.
am melancholy

the thing

I

,

Peirce might respond to this objection

I

am angry, that thing need not be the intentional

In "Consequences," 5-292, he conceded that when I

for example,

I

may not identify any particular thing as

am melancholy about.

Nevertheless, he asserts, the feeling

of melancholy can "only come into consciousness through tinging the

objects of thought."

What he means here,

I

take it, is that when one is

melancholy a peculiar quality of feeling suffuses one's experience and
one attributes this quality to virtually anything one encounters, without

thereby taking any of these as the object of one's mood.

One's room,

the picture on the wall, the clouds seen from the window seem drab and
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depressing.
way.

Perhaps, in certain cases, anger acts on me in
a similar

The people I meet on the street, the buildings

vile to me.

I

I

pass, appear

am not angry at the people or the buildings, but
at

Jones, the man

I

believe to have stolen my wallet

Even if Jones exists

.

merely in my imagination and my judgment 'Jones
is vile' picks out no
external object, still my judgments concerning the
people passing by in
the street do attribute vileness to real external
objects.

contend that whenever

I

Peirce might

am angry I successfully ascribe vileness to some

external thing, though the intentional object of my anger may
fail to
exist in the external world.

Peirce's response does not meet the objection, however.

Some

instances of anger resemble the case described above, but not all.
anger may be very well focused.

My

The only thing I think vile in certain

situations may be that my wallet has been stolen.
to judge that anything else is vile.

I

may have no tendency

Supposing, in such a case, that no

theft has actually occurred, there will be no external thing

I

take to

be vile. Furthermore, even when my anger is a difuse tendency to judge
that anything

encounter is vile, all of these judgments may fail to

I

connect with the external world.

Imagine me in the grip of a total

hallucination.

I

I

am angry because

believe, mistakenly, that someone

stole my wallet. Suppose that a quality of vileness suffuses my hallucin-

atory world.
seems vile.

The man in the clown suit staring at me from the doorway
So does the woman floating over my head and the huge rabbit

pursuing her. None of these judgments pick out anything external to my
delusion:

nevertheless,

I

am angry.

II
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The counter-examples offered above
do not conclusively refute the

Externalization Thesis
Four.

,

even in the strong version presupposed
in Question

suggested previously that one ought to
regard ET as an empirical

I

claim and that only a detailed
psychological investigation would confirm
or refute.

Peirce might well deny that any cases
such as those described

in the preceding paragraph actually occur.

though

Perhaps he would be right,

believe that the foregoing discussion creates
serious doubts

I

concerning the strong version of ET.

On the other hand, he might concede

the objection and adopt a weaker version of
ET

.

Since the problems

mentioned arise because the strong version of ET requires
that the
subject’s judgment that something is vile actually pick
out some external
object, it would be natural to weaken ET by moving to the
de dicto

interpretation
In ius de dicto reading, ET stipulates only that, when the
subject
is angry

,

he judges that some external thing is vile.

The subject’s

judgment may fail to connect with any existing external object, but it
is an external judgment, i.e., a judgment which, in the subject's

intention, concerns something external.
need not state an external fact.

Unfortunately, the judgment

For that reason, the de dicto version

of ET fits uncomfortably into the argument of Question Four.

Peirce

wants that argument to show that our knowledge of the internal world
derives from external facts.

Given his refusal to commit himself to the

existence of an external world, 5.244, however, the notion of an external
fact is none too clear in "Questions".

racts does not exclude a

de_

Perhaps his talk about external

dicto reading of ET.
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In any case, the move to
a oe dicto interpretation
of ET avoids one

objection only to encounter another.

Sometimes vhen one is angry one

does not even believe that any
external thing is vile.

I

mlght be

„,

oveij

to anger by Thackeray's account of
the escapades of Barry Lyndon
without

ceasing to believe that

I

am reading a work of fiction and
that there is

no such person as Barry Lyndon.
of my own thoughts:

Likewise,

I

may be angry about certain

'What an abominable idea!', I might
say to myself.

One could reply to the latter example that
the judgment in question is

actually a judgment about myself,
an idea,' and that
I

I

'I

am abominable for entertaining such

am, after all, an external object.

am an external object is, however, beside the
point.

that

I

am.

I

may think that

do so believe,

abominable when

I

am an immaterial soul.

Whether or not
I

may not believe

Supposing that I

would not be judging that some external object is

I

I

castigate myself in the terms indicated, above.

Peirce might defuse this objection by further weakening ET.

He

could argue that the counter-examples above describe a subject who
has

acquired a degree of sophistication concerning his internal states.

To

judge that one is angry while withholding judgment or denying that any-

thing external is vile presupposes that one has a conception of internal
states as distinct from external conditions.

He might offer ET as an

account of the subject's earlier, unsophisticated experience of the

internal world.

Thus, Peirce might contend that our initial experience

of our own anger gets expressed in judgments that some external object
is vile, and that only after going through some process of intellectual
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development can we disassociate anger from
beliefs about the external
world.
One may wonder whether the attenuated version
of ET suggested above
can have the general epistemological consequences
Peirce claims for ET
in Question Four.

A more pressing question, however, is whether
any

version of ET will support the argument of Question
Four.
weak,

Neither the

variant of ET considered above nor the strong version
presupposed

in Question Four says anything directly about what
justifies the subject’s

belief that he is angry.

At most ET asserts that, whenever the subject

is angry, he correctly takes some external object
to be vile.

It does

not say that he is justified in believing he is angry because
he infers
that belief from the judgment that some external thing is vile.

Peirce

needs to fill the gap between the psychological theory advanced in
ET
and the epistemological conclusion of his argument in Question Four.

There is reason co doubt that Peirce can bridge this gap.
what he must do to show that the internal statement

'I

Consider

am angry' is

justified for the subject by inference from the external statement,
’This thing is vile.

this question.

’

I

cannot provide a satisfactory general answer to

But, at a minimum, it seems that, if a subject S is

justified in accepting a judgment P by reason of his having inferred P
from another judgment E, then S must also be justified in accepting E.

This condition does not capture everything involved in the notion of

justification by inference.
however.

It does represent a necessary condition,

If E is not warranted for S and P is, then wherever S gets his

I

warrant for accepting P it does not come via inference from
warrant to lend.

E:

E has no
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Certain instances of justification by
inference may seem to constitute counter-examples to the principle
just proposed.
reasons as follows:

It

Suppose that Mary

my ex-husband George attends the wedding,

shall probably get angry because

I

can't stand the sight of him.

I

On the

other hand, if he fails to attend. I'll
probably get angry because he
hasn’t shown the common decency to appear at
his own daughter's wedding.
Since George will either attend or not attend,

I

shall probably get

angry. Mary's argument could be represented
as follows:
1.

George attends the wedding.

2.

If George attends then, probably, Mary gets angry.

3.

George does not attend.

^

^

5-

Either George attends or George does not attend.

6.

If George attends or George does not attend then, probably,

George does not attend then, probably, Mary gets angry.

Mary gets angry.
7(I

Therefore, probably, Mary gets angry.

have omitted certain obvious steps in the argument.)
One might argue that the conclusion, (j), is warranted for Mary by

inference from (l) and (3), among other premisses.

Further, neither (l)

nor (3) need be warranted for her in order for the argument in question
to justify her belief that she will get angry.

Mary is justified in accepting

(7)

Thus, one might conclude,

by reason of having inferred that

conclusion from (l) and (3), though neither premise need be warranted
for her.

Of course, the argument in question contains premisses other
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than (1) and (3), but Peirce does not
claim that 'This thing is vile’
must be the only premise occurring in
the inference which justifies the

subject's belief that he is angry.

Perhaps then the subject can justify

the belief that he is angry by inference
from the premise that some

external thing is vile even though he is not
warranted in accepting that
premise

Mary’s argument does not constitute a counter-example
to the above
principle, however.

Mary is not justified in believing that she will

get angry b^ reas on of having inferred that conclusion
from premisses
(l)

and (3).

An inference containing those premisses does justify
the

conclusion for her, but the occurrence of

(l)

and (3) in that argument

is superfluous from the standpoint of justification.

The argument in

question justifies here the conclusion even when those premisses are
deleted.

V.hat

justifies Mary’s belief that she will get angry is that,

as a matter of logic, either George will attend or George will not

attend, and that, as a matter of fact, either eventuality will make her
angry.

ing (7

Premisses (5) and (6) are the ones that justify Mary in accept)

and she may use the argument in question to justify that con-

clusion only if she is warranted in accepting those premisses.

Keeping the foregoing discussion in mind, is it true that, whenever
the subject is warranted in believing that he is angry, that belief is

justified for him by inference from an external judgment such as 'This

thing is vile’?

I

mentioned previously certain cases in which the

subject is angry but does not judge that any external thing is vile.
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Similar cases suggest that the subject may be
warranted in believing
that he is angry and not warranted in judging
that something external is
vile.

I

may recognize that Thackery's account of
Redmond Barry's behavior

toward the Countess of Lyndon has made me angry
and understand perfectly
well that
vile man.”

I

refer to no actual person when

I

exclaim,

'That Barry is a

Likewise, it seems that one suffering from feelings
of

persecution may be warranted in taking himself to be angry,
but not

warranted in concluding that some abominable external
conspiracy is
directed against him.

If cases such as those just described do occur,

then, in conjunction with the earlier remarks on justification
by

inference, they show that the subject is sometimes justified in be—
that he is angry but not justified in so believing by inference
from the external judgment that something is vile.

It seems that such

cases do occur.

The above objection suggests that Peirce is mistaken in believing
that

our whole knowledge of the internal world is derived from observa-

tion of external facts.”

However, he might be able to concede the

objection without sacrificing that conclusion.

He might allow that one

may know that one is now angry without being warranted in judging that
something external is now vile, but contend that, at some earlier stage
of one's intellectual development, one's belief that one was angry must

have been justified by inference from an external judgment such as 'This

thing is vile.'
game.

By itself this concession comes close to giving up the

In Question Four Peirce claims to establish that we have no power

of introspection, not merely that we have no such power at some point in

ho

our intellectual development.

Nevertheless, if he could establish that

our later ability to recognize the character of
our mental states

depends upon our having gone through such a developmental
stage, he

might be able to show that ve could not now be justified in
believing
that we are angry unless we were, at some point, justified in
believing

that various external things were vile
I

shall not speculate about how Peirce might work out the sort of

argument suggested above.

Clearly it will require a much more compli-

cated account of the derivation of one’s knowledge that one is angry
than he provides in Question Four.

Further, he has yet to offer any

good reason for holding that one's warrant for believing that one is

angry ever derives by inference from the judgment that some external

thing is vile.

If my discussion of the argument of Question Four has

discovered no crushing objection to that argument, it has likewise
failed to turn up any particular reason for accepting it.

Why this disappointing result?

I

think that the reason is that, in

’’Questions," Peirce fails to distinguish between explaining how one came

to have a certain belief and explaining how that belief is justified.
If accepted, the Externalization Thesis does provide grounds for sup-

posing that our beliefs concerning the internal world derive, in some
sense, from judgments about external objects.

That is, the explanation

of how we came to have those beliefs will probably make reference to our

original externalized experience of the inner world.
acceptable version of ET

,

There may be no

but that thesis is at least relevant to some

sorts of questions concerning derivation.

Peirce fails, however, to

demonstrate its relevance to questions concerning
justification.
these are the questions at issue between Peirce
and Cartesianism

Since
this

,

failure is serious.
The shortcomings of his argument in Question Four
notwithstanding,
I

believe that Peirce has plausible arguments for conclusions more

limited than, but similar to, his conclusion in Question Four.

To

develop these arguments, however, one must go beyond the material

provided in

Questions.

Chapters IV and V.

I

shall examine these more limited arguments in

CHAPTER

III

INTUITION AND INFERENCE

In the argument of Question Four Peirce says nothing
specifically

about the thesis that we have immediate or intuitive
knowledge of the

inner world.

He rejects this claim by implication when he maintains

that our whole knowledge of the inner world derives by
inference from

external facts, but he does not consider the claim in its own right.
The topic of intuitive knowledge assumes a more prominent place in
his

other two arguments concerning introspection.

In both he contends

explicitly against the assertion that we know certain sorts of truths
about the incernal world intuitively

,

To evaluate these arguments one

needs to understand what Peirce affirms when he rejects intuitive

knowledge of mind.

An understanding of his views on intuitive and

inferential knowledge also allows one to see more clearly just what
Peirce needs to establish in order to show that beliefs about the
internal world are justified by reference to external statements.

Under Question One, Peirce explains what he means by "intuition":
The term intuition will be taken as signifying
a cognition not determined by previous cognitions
and therefore so determined by something out
A cognition
of the consciousness
determined directly by the transcendental object, is
to be termed an intuition.
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An intuition, then, is a cognition "determined" only by the object of

knowledge and not by other cognitions.

He opposes intuition to

inferential knowledge which does involve the determination of cognitions

h2

^3

by other cognitions.

Judging from Peirce's theory of mental activity in

"Consequences," for one cognition to determine another is for
the two
cognitions to stand in some relation analogous to the relation
between a

premise and the conclusion Ox an inference ^5*267)

.

As

I

argued in

Chapter II, Peirce's contention that judgments about the inner world are
determined by external judgments does not contradict the Cartesian

tradition unless determination involves justification.

Working out the

inference which determines a given belief must explain the subject's

justification for so believing and not merely how he came by the belief
in question. It would seem, then, that when Peirce asserts that one's

knowledge of some truth is not intuitive, he supposes that one has

actually carried out an inference which justifies one in accepting that
truth.

The account of intuitive knowledge presented above creates certain

problems for Peirce.

Consider, for example, a student who learns that

Marcus Aurelius was a Roman emperor and learns this as a result of

having been so informed by a recognized authority.

In the normal case,

the student simply takes this information to heart without running

through any inference which justifies him in believing it.

Plato would

deny that the student has acquired knowledge rather than true opinion in
the case described.

Current views on when one knows something tend to

be permissive, however, and contemporary epistemologists generally allow
that one may obtain knowledge through unreflective listening and reading.
If these are not allowed as sources of knowledge, few of us know any-

thing about events we have not witnessed for ourselves.

But, if

HU

the student in the case described above acquires knowledge
of the

career of Marcus Aurelius, then, according to Peirce's account
of
intuition, his knowledge is intuitive.

The student does know and he

has not carried out any inference justifying his claim to know.

The case just described points up a serious problem for Peirce's

critique of introspection.
states.

We do not reflect much about our own mental

We seldom ask ourselves how we know that we believe, intend,

love or perceive.

Nor do we often worry about what justifies us in

regarding such things as features of the internal world.
suggests that

,

in the usual case

,

Peirce never

we do not know whether we intend to do

something, or that intending is a mental activity.

Thus, given his

contention that we do not know such things immediately, it seems he must
claim that

,

under normal circumstances

,

we do carry out inferences which

justify our beliefs about our internal states.

This claim appears

doubt ful

Peirce is well aware of the difficulties raised above and he confronts

them directly.

How, he asks, does one know whether someone has carried

out an inference in a particular case?

The obvious answer is that

,

when

the someone is 'another person, one asks, and when the someone is oneself,
one knows by introspection.

Both responses suppose that the subject

can tell by introspection whether he has engaged in inference.

But the

whole point of Peirce's discussion in Question One is to deny that this
is so.

He argues that one may arrive at knowledge by inference without

being aware that he has made any inference

1+5

Peirce recognizes that he has some explaining to do here.

At the

conclusion of "Question One" he writes:
° remains only to explain why the orevious
cognitions which determine J a conclusionj are
not more clearly apprehended.
Just
as we are able to recognize our friends by
certain appearances, although we cannot
possibly say what those appearances are and
are quite unconscious of any process of
reasoning, so in any case where the reasoning is easy and natural to us, however
complex may be the premisses they sink
into insignificance and oblivion proportionately to the satisfactoriness of the theory
based upon them.
(5-223)
-1-

.

.

.

,

I

take Peirce to be saying in 5-223 that in cases where the reasoning

involved is of a sort in which one is well -practiced and where the conclusions arrived at by this sort of reasoning are usually correct, or at
least not disconfirmed, one focuses on the conclusion and does not

attend to the reasoning by which it was obtained.

Leaving aside, for the moment, questions about the plausiblity of
this account, Peirce still has something to explain.

If one cannot tell

by introspection whether one has inferred a given judgment

,

how does one

discover whether a particular bit of knowledge is inferential?

His

answer, in Question One, is that one should decide whether the subject

knows some fact immediately or inferentially by considering which alternative is most plausible in light of the facts of the case in question.
One should consider the nature of the thing known, what sort of contact

the knower has with that thing, what sorts of cognitive processes and

abilities one may reasonably ascribe to him.

cussion in 5-222:

Thus, the following dis-

The pitch of a tone depends upon the rapidity
of the succession of the vibrations which
reach the ear
Each of these vibrations
produces an impulse upon the ear. Let a
single such impulse be made upon the ear,
and we know, experimentally, that it is
perceived. There is good reason, therefore,
to believe that each of the impulses forming
a tone is perceived.
Therefore, the
pitch of a tone depends upon the rapidity
with which certain impressions are successively
conveyed to the mind. These impressions must
exist previously to any tone; hence, the
sensation of pitch is determined by previous
cognitions.
Nevertheless, this would never
have been discovered by the mere contemplation
of that feeling.
.

.

.

.

Here Peirce argues that the sensation of pitch (which is a thought,

something on the order of a judgment, according to Peirce) is determined

by previous cognition.
and how we perceive it.

He bases his view on an account of what pitch is

The strategy employed resenbles that of his

argument from the Externalization Thesis to the claim that knowledge of
the internal as internal is inferential.

That is, he first explains

what we experience when we encounter the phenomenon of pitch and then
argues that we must make some inference in order to get from knowledge
of what is presented in that experience to knowledge of the phenomenon
itself.
In "Questions" Peirce does not rest his argument for the inferenti-

ality of inner knowledge entirely on his account of internal phenomena
and our experience of them.

He also seeks to establish that we have

available to us evidence from which conclusions about the internal can
be inferred. This part of his argument is important because, as Chapter
II shows, arguments from psychological theories concerning the nature of

experience to conclusions about our knowledge of what experience reveals

are not likely to conclusively rule out the
Cartesian account of inner

knowledge

.

In Questions Two and Three, for example,
he argues that we

need not suppose that the subject has immediate
knowledge of self or
that he can distinguish intuitively among the
various sorts of mental
states.

We need not make these suppositions, Peirce says,
because there

are other things which the subject is in a position
to know from which

he may infer either the existence of self, or that he
is in such and

such a sort of mental state.
At this point, a weakness in the strategy of "Questions"
becomes
appai ent

.

To show that our knowledge of some truth about the internal

world must be inferential, it does not suffice to show that there is
evidence available from which one could justifiably infer that truth.
One might know immediately that p and also have at one's disposal

evidence from which one could infer that p.

In Questions Two and Three

Peirce argues that we need not suppose that the subject has intuitive

knowledge of the inner world.

To show the hypothesis of inferentiality

provides a better explanation of the facts concerning our inner knowledge than the hypothesis of immediacy, he must do more than show that
we could get by without the latter hypothesis.
One who holds that the subject knows immediately that p is committed,
not to the claim that the subject has no evidence for p, but to the

claim that he is justified in believing that p whether or not he has
such evidence.

What Peirce needs to establish is that the subject

cannot be justified in believing that p without having evidence for p.
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That is, he needs to show that, for any statement
p about the subject's

inner world such that the subject knows that
p, there is a body of

statements,
of e

i’

c

'

e_^

‘

»

.

,

e

e

.

n

,

each distinct from p, such that (i) the truth

cons titutes evidence for the truth of
p, and (ii) the

n

subject is not justified in believing that
p is true unless he is

justified in accepting

e.

,

.

.

.

,

e

.

n

If Peirce can establish that

conditions (i) and (ii) hold for an internal statement
p, he will have
shown not only that the subject has evidence for
p, but also that the

subject’s being justified in believing that p is conditional upon his

being justified in accepting such evidence.
Clearly, it will often prove difficult to say, regarding a particular internal judgment, whether the conditions mentioned above are satisfied. To give a general account of the circumstances under which condi-

tions (i) and (ii) hold for any statement requires nothing less than

developing a theory evidence and confirmation.
available and

I

shall not attempt to devise one.

be sufficient for

ray

Wo such theory is readily
I

think that it will

purposes to consider Peirce's specific suggestions

concerning the sorts of statements which can serve as evidence for
judgments about one’s internal world and to ask, first, whether it seems
that these statements do have the evidentiary force he ascribes to them,
and second, whether it is reasonable to hold that the subject is justi-

fied in accepting the inner judgment in question, supposing that he is
not warranted in accepting the evidentiary statements.

to such specific cases in the next two chapters.

I

shall get down

k9

Before proceeding with that discussion some
further comments are in
order.

In Question Four and, apparently, in
his later critique of

introspection, Peirce maintains, not merely that
inner knowledge is not
immediate, but that it derives from external
facts.

This further claim

can be expressed using the characterization
of inferential knowledge

worked out above.

One need only add to conditions (i) and (ii) a
third

condition stating that some of the statements
(i)

e.

.

.

,

.

,

e

satisfying

and (ii) are external statements.
A final question remains concerning Peirce's account of
inferential

knowledge.

Suppose he has established that, for some inner judgment,
p,

there exists a body of statements
(i)

and (ii)

.

e..

,

.

.

.

,

satisfying conditions

e

Given that the subject knows that o is true, does the

above result make it reasonable to suppose that the subject has carried
out an inference justifying his belief that p?

Neither (i) nor (ii)

actually requires that the subject have inferred p from e.,
1
order to know that p.

(i)

stipulates that e

.

.

,

.

e

,

.

.

.,

in

e

n

constitute

n

evidence for p; (ii) that the subject is not justified in believing that
p, unless he is also warranted in accepting e^

said about inference.

,

.

.

.

,

e

n

Nothing is

Perhaps, in general, the existence of a body of

evidence satisfying conditions (i) and (ii) relative to some judgment p
does create a presumption in favor of the claim that, if the subject

knows that p, he has justified his belief that p by inference from e^
.

.,

e

n

-

,

But there would seem to be cases where that presumption is

defeated. Peirce admits, as we have seen in 5.223, that the subject may

know that p, although he is not conscious of having inferred that p and

.
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cannot even explicitly formulate premisses from
which p could he inferred.

Such circumstances seem to provide good evidence that
the subject did
not infer that p and, given that he knows that
p, that he knows without

having inferred, i.e., he knows intuitively that
p.
Not so, says Peirce.

described

The subject did infer that p in the case

it is just that his inference was unconscious.

response leads to further difficulties, however.

This

Peirce concedes that

the subject may be unable consciously to reconstruct the reasoning which

justifies a particular belief.
certain appearances,

"We are able to recognize our friends by

he says, "although we cannot possibly say what

those appearances are" 5*223.

But, if the subject cannot consciously

formulate an inference justifying his belief, what reason has Peirce for

supposing that he can do so unconsciously?

The subject's inability to

work out an explicit argument justifying his belief would seem to be
strong evidence that he is incapable of carrying through such reasoning,

consciously or otherwise.
Peirce might deal with the above objection in a way recommended by
Gilbert Harman.

.

^

Harman wants to show that what he calls "ordinary

perceptual knowledge" is inferential.

He notes that certain philoso-

phers have rejected this claim on the following grounds:
It is clear that there is no conscious reasoning
How could there be if
in ordinary perception.

we are not conscious of the premises of
this reasoning? And philosophers have suggested
that it is pure obscurantism to suggest that
there is unconscious reasoning from unconscious
premises, especially since such reasoning would
have to be "instantaneous." (p. 19)

’'’Gilbert

Harman, Thought

,

Princeton, 1973, pp. 19-20.
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Harman replies to this line of argument by
standing it on its head.
A difficulty with such arguments is that they
require the assumption that we have an independent way to tell when inference has occurred and
when it has not .... However the only way to
discover when a person mah.es an inference is to
discover what assumptions about inference are
needed to account for his knowledge. We can
turn the arguments just considered on their heads.
Knowledge of the world is based on inference. If
there is knowledge of the world in perception,
then there is inference in perception. If we
are not conscious of the inference then there is
unconscious inference.
If it would have to be
instantaneous, then inference takes no time.
If
we were not aware of the premises, then we can
make inferences without being aware of the
premises of those inferences.
(p. 20)
,

,

Although it may be possible to brazen out any objections to unconscious inference, it would be better not to rely on this problematical
notion.

The move to the hypothesis that the subject engages in uncon-

scious inference is motivated, in the context under consideration, by
the assumption that, if the subject is justified in believing that p,

then he must have actually justified his belief that p, or at least be
able to justify that belief.

Bruce Aune

,

in some comments on a paper by

James Cornman, has challenged this assumption.

p

Aune points out that we

sometimes grant that a person has knowledge, even though he is unable to

construct an adequate justification for the relevant belief.

A passing

acquaintance with the literature on skepticism suffices to show that

although philosophers have found it extraordinarily difficult to formulate

Bruce Aune, "Review of Cornman," unpublished.
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convincing arguments for such beliefs as that an
external world exists,
or that other people have minds, they are unwilling
to deny that they

are justified in holding these beliefs.
I

shall not try to present Aune's position in any detail.

I

mention his view primarily in order to suggest that it is by
no means
clear just what the subject must do to be justified in accepting
a

particular belief,. For this reason, it is unwise to make the issue

between Peirce’s and the Cartesian’s account of inner knowledge turn on
suppositions concerning the reasonings in which people actually engage.
The Cartesian holds that merely being in a given mental state or

experiencing a particular internal phenomenon justifies the subject in
claiming inner knowledge

,

independently of any other sorts of evidence

the subject may have available.

If Peirce can show that there is

evidence bearing on one's inner judgments, that one is not justified in
claiming inner knowledge unless one is also justified in accepting such
evidence

,

and that merely being in or experiencing a mental state does

not justify one in accepting such evidence, he will have shown that the

Cartesian account of inner knowledge is not adequate.

Questions about

how the requirements for inner knowledge just mentioned are satisfied
in the cognitive activities of human subjects can be put aside as problems

for a general theory of knowledge.

CHAPTER

IV

THE ARGUMENT OF "CONSEQUENCES"

Peirce's second argument concerning whether we have a
power of

introspection is less ambitious than his argument in Question
Four.

In

the latter argument he regards as introspective "any
knowledge of the

internal world not derived from external observation" (5.244).
defines introspection more narrowly in the second argument

spection

I

:

He

"By intro-

mean a direct perception of the internal world" (5.244).

The

notion of direct perception here employed is an epistemological one.
The question at issue is whether we have intuitive or immediate know-

ledge of the internal world.
not

Further, Peirce's second argument concerns,

our whole knowledge of the internal world," but only our knowledge

of mental operations or activities:

"As for the mind's watching its own

operations, no such thing is possible.

.

.

.

The real operation of

thought is something purely inferential" (7-376).

What is at stake in

the second argument is whether the subject knows immediately that he is

engaged in a given sort of mental operation, for example, whether he is
reasoning, intending, willing, or sensing.

Had he succeeded in showing

that all our knowledge of internal things derives by inference from

external facts

Peirce would need no separate argument for a negative

answer to the question just raised.

The failure of his earlier argument

does not rule out a negative answer to this question, however.
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Internal

5^

knowledge may be derived, i.e., non-intuitive

,

without having been

derived from external facts.
Peirce best expresses his reasons for holding that we
do not

directly perceive our own mental operations in "Some
Consequences of
Four Incapacities,

an essay published in 1868 as a companion piece to

"Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man."

He explains

his position regarding direct perception of mental operations
in the

course of working out a general theory of mental activity.

In order

to present his second argument, I must first expound that theory.

My

exposition will occasionally draw on his later works, but all references
in the text are to "Consequences" unless otherwise noted.

Peirce's theory of mental activity

Among the constituents of the inner world, Peirce distinguishes
feelings, thoughts or ideas, and modes of thought.

term "mode of thought" from Descartes.
(5-291, for example) but

I

I

have borrowed the

Peirce uses it occasionally

shall use it generally.

The modes of thought

include activities such as sensing, imagining, willing, and reasoning,
as well as things usually conceived as dispositions or states, for

example, beliefs, intentions, and emotions.

The term "mode of thought"

recommends itself both because it is neutral between activities and

dispositions, and for other reasons which will become apparent when

Peirce theory of mental activities has been presented.
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Concerning feelings Peirce writes
Take whatever is directly and immediately in
consciousness at any instant, just as it is,
without regard to what it signifies, to what
its parts are, to what causes it, or to any or
its relations to anything else, and that is what
letens meant "by Feeling; and I shall invariably
use the word in the same sense. (7-5^0, From
an untitled manuscript, circa 1900.)

Peirce discusses feelings in his theory of mental activity
pri-

marily in order to contrast them with thoughts and modes of
thought.
For this purpose he emphasizes two points in his account of feelings
(l)

Feelings, as such, are essentially non-relational.

In themselves,

they do not signify any objects and they have no logical relations to
other feelings or to thoughts.

A feeling is a feeling because of its

intrinsic features and not in virtue of its relations to other things.
As Peirce puts it in "Phaneroscopy” (1907):

"By a feeling

I

mean an

instance of that sort of element of consciousness which is all that it
is positively, in itself, regardless of anything else" (1.306)

Feelings can be present in an instant.
requires time to complete.

They are not processes which it

Any temporal segment of a feeling of a given

kind is itself a feeling of the same kind.
oscopy":

.

.

if

[

a

(2)

Quoting again from "Phaner-

feeling is present during a lapse of time, it is

wholly and equally present at every moment of that time" (1.306).

As

we shall see, the first feature distinguishes feelings from thoughts and
the second marks off feelings from modes of thought.
The theory of mental activities in "Consequences" presents Peirce's
first account of thoughts and of the various modes of thought.

His
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later writings add considerably to his descriptions
of the different

modes and his taxonomy of modes changes from time
to time.

Nevertheless,

the basic account set out in "Consequences" remains
substantially

unchallenged in his subsequent works.

According to that account, to

engage in any sort of mental activity or to be in a mental
state of a

given type, is to think in certain ways, i.e., to have or
be disposed to
have certain sorts of thoughts.
"mode of thought

(Hence, the appropriateness of the term

.

"

Since thoughts are the constituents of every sort of mental activity,
Peirce opens his account of the modes of thought with some remarks on
the nature of thoughts.

Every thought, he maintains, involves a sign.

"Whenever we think we have present to the consciousness some feeling,
image, conception, or other representation which serves as a sign"

(

5

.

283 ).

Peirce uses the term "thought -sign" to refer to this representational
element within a thought and sometimes to the thought itself.

In order

for something to serve as a sign three conditions must be fulfilled.

Now a sign has, as such, three references:
first,
it is a sign to some thought which interprets it;
second, it is a sign for some object to which in
that thought it is equivalent; third, it is a
sign, in some respect or quality, which brings
it into connection with its object.
(5-283)

Taken together the features mentioned above might be called the

rational qualities of a sign.

These qualities determine the sign's

place in reasoning and discourse.

All three raise questions of inter-

pretation. The first may be explained roughly as follows:

something to be a sign, it must be a sign to someone.

In order for

For something to
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be a sign to someone is for someone to interpret it,
i.e., the sign must

suggest some object to the interpreter and, perhaps, indicate
to him

something about that object.

This might be put by saying that the

interpreter must have some thought relating the sign to its object and
to some information about that object.

Thus, there must be some thought

which interprets the sign.
The second condition seems more obvious:
some object.

the sign must designate

But it is not clear from Peirce's discussion in "Conse-

quences" whether every sign actually picks out some object.

At one

point he maintains that, if a sign designates an object, it does so

indirectly, through some connection with other thoughts, and allows that
a sign may fail to pick out any "outward" object, even indirectly.

What does a thought-sign name, what is its
suppositum, for what does it stand? The
outward thing, undoubtedly, when a real outward thing is thought of. But still, it is
determined by previous thoughts of the same
object:
it only refers to the object by
denoting this thought.
5 285
(

*

)

Elsewhere, however, Peirce contends that a sign must have a "real,

physical connection

.

.

.

with its object, immediately or by its connection

with another sign" (5*287)*

(Be calls this real, physical connection

the pure demonstrative application of a sign, 5*287*)

This suggests

that ultimately every sign denotes some real object.
The third feature is difficult to explain.

Peirce seems to suppose

that a thought-sign not only picks out an object, but also predicates

something of that object.

He says, for example, that we cannot simply

think of Toussaint L' Overture:

we must think of him as something, or
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under some description; as a man, a negro, a general,
or as the liberator of Haiti, for instance.

So interpreted, the third condition

amounts to the claim that thought-signs have a subject-predicate
form.
This may ecplain why Peirce frequently refers to the thing
designated

by a thought-sign as the sign's "subject."

(See 5-292, for example.)

Perhaps it would be best to express the third condition as follows:
every thought-sign occurs in the context of a thought which predicates

something of the object of that sign.

In any case, this is the best

I

can do with the third condition except to refer the reader to Peirce's

own discussion in 5-286.
In addition to its rational qualities a sign has certain material

qualities

.

Since a sign is not identical with the thing
signified, but differs from the latter in
some respect, it must plainly have some
characters which belong to it in itself,
and have nothing to do with its representative function. These I shall call the
material qualities of a sign. (5-287)

Peirce offers an analogy in this connection between thought-signs and

word-tokens, e.g., man

.

The rational features of the word-token are

its denotation and meaning.

Its material qualities are a certain

shape, color, location and so forth.

The specific material qualities

of the word-token are accidental from the point of view of the token's

function in literal discourse and reasoning, but they serve to distinguish this particular token and, presumably, the word-type associated

with this token can enter into discourse only in some material embodiment.
So in the case of thought-signs, the sign must have some material
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qualities which distinguish it from other thought-signs and by
means of

which it appears in the thinker's consciousness (see 5.287 and
7.356,
Logic_, 1873,

for Peirce's development of this analogy.)

According to Peirce, the material qualities of thought-signs are
qualities of feeling.

"Every thought," he remarks, "is, so far as it

is immediately present, a mere sensation,

...

a mere feeling,"

5

.

289

.

Thus, thoughts, considered merely as events in consciousness are ensem-

bles of material qualities, feelings.

They possess, in addition, however,

a natural nature which accounts for their representational and logical

properties.

A sign's specific material qualities are irrelevant to its

rational nature.
The foregoing exposition is intended to set the stage for a discus-

sion of Peirce's critique of introspection, rather than as contribution
to the literature on his remiatic theory.

Hence,

I

shall not follow up

the questions it raises concerning the relation between thoughts and

their objects.

For my purposes it suffices to emphasize two points:

first, something is a sign in virtue of its bearing certain relations to

other thoughts -~ those thoughts which interpret it

—

and, perhaps

,

to

some object, and second, the material qualities of a thought-sign do not

account for its representative function or its place in reasoning.

Thoughts, in Peirce’s view, are the constituents of all mental
activities.

The basic type of mental activity is cognition.

maintains that "we must

,

as far as we can do so

of mental action" to cognition,

5.

not mean an atomic act of knowing.

266-. 267

.

.

.

.

,

Indeed, he

reduce all kinds

By cognition, Peirce does

Cognition is a process of thought-

6o

sign interpretation.

That is, a cognition forms a sequence of thoughts

each member of which is determined by earlier members
according to the
laws of mental association."

valid reasoning

-

These laws are simply the principles of

deductive, inductive, and abduct ive or hypothetical.

Cognition, then, is a process of inference

(

5

.266- 282
.

)

The above account leads Peirce to conclude that cognition cannot be

instantaneous.

The succession of thoughts is a temporal succession

occupying a lapse of time.

For this reason, he argues, a cognition

cannot exist in the mind at any one instant, but only in a relation

among thoughts present at different times.
At no one instant in my state of mind is there
cognition or representation, but in the relation
of my states of mind at different instants
there is.
(5.289)

Again, in a letter to W. T. Harris explaining the two essays of 1868

writes

,

he

:

I do not say that we are ignorant of our state
of mind. What I say is that mind is virtual,
not in a series of moments not capable of
existing except in a space of time
nothing
(8.2U8)
so far as it is at any moment.
,

—

Peirce contrasts cognitions so conceived with feelings or sensations.
Two sorts of objects, what we are immediately
conscious of and what we are mediately conscious
Some eleof, are found in all consciousness.
ments (the sensations) are completely present
at every instant so long as they last, while
others (like thoughts [here used to mean
are actions having
processes of thought/
and consist in
end,
and
middle,
beginning,
which
flow though
a congruence of sensation
present
to us,
They cannot be
the mind.
past or
the
but must cover some portion of
future.
(5.395, "The Fixation of Belief.")
)

6l

The point of this comparison is not just that cognition covers
a

lapse of time; feelings also have duration.

But, in the case of a

feeling, a sensation of red, for example, any temporal segment of that

feeling will itself be a sensation of red.

Not so for cognitions.

The

duration of a cognition is taken up by various distinct thoughts.
are not themselves cognitions.

These

Since all that can be present at a given

instant while cognition is in progress is a thought and, since Peirce

maintains that all that can be present to the mind is what can be
present in an instant

,

he argues that cognitions can never be present to

the mind.

Peirce offers just such an argument in his Logic of 1873.
he says

,

Suppose,

that one idea has determined another.

Now when this happens after the first idea
comes the second.
There is a process which
can only take place in a space of time; but
an idea is not present to the mind
during a space of time in which this idea is
replaced by another; for when the moment of
it is no longer in
its being present is past
Therefore, the fact that one
the mind at all.
idea succeeds another is not a thing which in
itself can be present to the mind.
7 3 ^8 )
,

.

.

.

,

-

(

Cognition and introspection

The account of cognition presented above helps to explain why

Peirce denies that we can directly perceive our own cognitions.

Intro-

spective perception is supposed to reveal the subject's current mental
state:

that is, it reveals what is present in the mind at the time the

perception occurs

.

But

,

a cognition

c anno ^

oe

present in the mind at
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any instant, and hence, not at the instant
of perception.

Direct

perception can disclose to the subject only that
which can be present in
an instant and a cognition will never be there
to be perceived.
If one supposes that introspective perception
is analogous in some

way to ordinary sense perception, the argument just
presented seems
rather hasty.

In the first place, it suggests that one could
not

perceive anything that takes time, for example, a snake’s
slithering
across the road.

But it seems that one who has continuously attended to

the snake during the entire period it took him to get across
the road

could properly be said to have perceived the snake’s passage.

Why not

suppose, then, that the subject can inspect the contents of his mind

continuously through a lapse of time long enough to encompass a cognition? Surely, if the subject has continuously attended to a cognition
from beginning to end, he has perceived that cognition.

Furthermore,

granting that one cannot perceive an entire cognition in an instant,
does it follow that one cannot perceive a cognition in an instant?

Thus

far, Peirce has not denied that one can perceive a part or a stage of a

cognition in an instant.

Sometimes perceiving a part of a thing counts

as perceiving the thing itself.

perceive an entire opaque cube

One cannot, for instance, directly

—

all six sides

—

in an instant.

Nevertheless, if ordinary usage is any guide, it seems that directly
seeing only the facing surface of a cube counts as seeing the cube.
Might not directly perceiving a part of a cognition count as perceiving
a cognition?
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To understand why Peirce restricts introspective
perception to

instantaneous glimpses and why he denies that directly
perceiving a part
of a cognition counts as directly perceiving the
cognition itself, one

must realize that certain epistemological considerations
govern his talk
about introspective perception.

What can be directly perceived, in his

view, is what can be known by direct perception.

The notion of knowledge

by direct perception provides one way of explaining what Peirce
means by
intuitive or immediate knowledge.

An intuition is an instance of

knowledge arising from a sort of direct intellectual contact with an
object and not determined or mediated by other thoughts (5.213).

Thus,

when he asks whether cognitions can be directly perceived, he is addressing the question of whether one can know by direct perception, i.e., by

intuition or immediately, that one is engaged in cognition.

Considered in this light, how would Peirce respond to the claim
that the subject can continuously attend to each stage of a cognition

and hence be said to perceive the entire cognition?
follows:

He would reply as

At any given time t at which the subject is attending to a

cognition, he has before him only what is present at t.

But, to know

that he is engaged in cognition, he must know that the mental contents

present at

t

were preceded by or will be followed by something else.

Can his direct contact with what is present at t give him such knowledge
all by itself?

No, his perception at t can give him such knowledge only

if it is supplemented by other thoughts; memories of what happened at an

earlier time, anticipations of the future.

Nor can his perception of

6h

the contents of mind at some earlier time t-n give him
knowledge at t of
his earlier condition, unless that previous perception
is recalled at t.

Therefore, continuous perception of a cognition results, at
best, in a

succession of independent acts of knowing each revealing only the
contents 01 mind at a particular instant.

For this reason, Peirce

maintains that one can directly perceive only what is present in an
instant
The same reasoning explains why perceiving a part of a cognition
does not count as perceiving a cognition.

by other thoughts

,

Such perception, unmediated

can result only in knowledge of things present in

that portion of the cognition and not in the knowledge that these things

constitute a segment of a cognition.

Thus, Peirce

f

s

restrictions on

introspective perception arise from epistemological motives.

He denies

that cognitions can be directly perceived because he denies that they
can be directly known.
I

have suggested that concerns about the Cartesian doctrine that

one has immediate knowledge of the modes of thought lie behind Peirce's

discussion of introspective perception.

Talk about direct perception

and knowledge by direct perception is not, perhaps, the most perspicuous

way of dealing with that thesis.

The metaphor of direct perception

occurs frequently enough in Cartesian discussion of introspection to

justify Peirce’s use of the notion in his criticism of those accounts.
Nevertheless, it is a metaphor and one may reasonably wonder whether the
arguments presented above do not depend upon taking that metaphor too

65

literally.

Further, the notion of knowledge by direct perception
needs

to be clearly explained.

Such an explanation must provide an account of

what it is for a bit of knowledge not to be 'mediated’ by other
thoughts.
Thus, it looks as though one needs to develop an account of
immediate

knowledge in order to explain knowledge by direct perception.

That

being the case, why not put the discussion in terms of immediate knowledge in the first place?

For the reasons given above,

I

propose to rephrase Peirce's remarks

on direct perception of cognition in terms of the account of immediate

knowledge presented in Chapter III.

Adopting that account, one would

ask whether Peirce can show that, in order for the subject to be justi-

fied in believing that he (the subject) is engaged in cognition, there

must be a statement or body of statements, e..
i

truth of e^

.

,

.

.

,

e

.

.,

e

n

such that (i) the

cons titutes evidence for the truth of the subject's

belief that he is engaged in cognition, and (ii) that the subject is not
warranted in so believing unless he is also warranted in accepting
e.
l

.....

e

.

n

If Peirce can show that this is the case whenever one

knows that one is engaged in cognition, he will have defeated the claim
that one has such knowledge immediately.

Peirce emphasizes that cognition consists in a relation holding
among various thoughts.

Indeed, he maintains that even a particular

thought is something essentially relational:

a given mental occurrence

constitutes a thought only if it stands in a certain relation to other

thoughts which interpret it and to some object of which it is a sign.
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This is at least part of what he means when he declares
that a thought
has no intellectual significance for what it is in itself,
hut only for

what it is in its effects upon other thoughts" (7.357).

As we have seen

Peirce exploits the relational nature of thinking in his arguments

concerning introspective perceptibility.

I

believe that this conception

of thought also provides him with an argument against immediate knowledge of cognition.

Consider iirst the case of an individual thought.

What distinguishes

having a thought from merely entertaining a bit of mental imagery?

According to Peirce a thought is distinguished by its rational qualities.
These involve, among other things, that the thought have an interpretation in other thoughts.

Having an interpretation, as he understands

that notion, is not merely a matter of having an analysis in terms of

other thoughts.

What he means primarily is that a particular thought

must have a place in a system of reasoning; conclusions can be drawn
from it, it can state evidence, formulate an hypothesis, be derived as a

conclusion from other thoughts.
The above suggests that all thoughts are, as it were, in the

indicative mood

—

-

that all express statements.

However,

I

think that

with slight changes in his account of the rational relations between
thoughts, Peirce can take account of imperative and interrogative

thoughts, for example. He argues that the principles governing rational

relations between thoughts are just the principles of valid inference,
deductive, inductive, and hypothetical.

On this scheme it would be

6?

difficult to account for rational relations
between inductive and non-

mdicative thoughts,
thoughts.

as well as

for such relations among non-indicative

The various attempts to formulate a logic
of questions or a

logic of imperatives, for example, suggest
that it is possible to formulate

principles governing the relations of these sorts of
thought among

themselves and to thoughts of other types.

By adding such principles to

his theory of mental action, Peirce could extend it to
cover non-

indicative thoughts.

Given the foregoing account of what it is to be a thought, Peirce
can plausibly maintain that

,

in order for one to know that some segment

of one's mental activity constitutes a thought, one must be justified
in

believing that it has an interpretation, i.e., that one could draw
certain conclusions from it and derive it as a conclusion from other
thoughts.

Further, one's ability to incorporate some mental content in

reasoning provides evidence that it has intellectual significance and,
hence

,

evidence that it is a thought

.

Thus

,

Peirce can show that

,

in

order for one to be justified in believing that one has a thought, one

must also be justified in accepting certain other statements, statements
concerning the thought's rational relations to other thoughts, which

provide evidence for the claim that one has a thought.
One might object that Peirce's account ties thoughts too closely to

sentences or statements.

verbal images.

Perhaps some thinking is conducted in non-

Likewise, one might charge that his account of thinking

is too restrictive.

In addition to various sorts of logical reasoning,

thinking perhaps involves non-logical associations among ideas.

Even
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granting these contentions, however, the strategy
of the argument
present above remains promising.

Peirce could argue that no mental

process counts as thinking unless it proceeds
according to some principles, though these be merely laws of association,
and that, for some

mental content to be a thought
ples to other thoughts.

than the one made above:
thought

9

,

it must be related by some such princi-

He could then press a weaker epistemic claim
in order for the subject to know that he has
a

he must be justified in believing that this 'thought'
is

related to other thoughts according to some principles of inference
or
association.

The possibility of non-verbal or non-logical thought does

not constitute, therefore, a major obstacle to a Peircean argument

against immediate knowledge of thoughts.

Turning to cognition as such, Peirce can again avail himself
of an argument based on the rational features of thinking.
as he understands that notion, is an instance of reasoning.

A cognition,
In order to

know that one is engaged in reasoning, it does not suffice that one know
that one has gone through a sequence of thoughts.

What distinguishes

reasoning from mere reverie is that in reasoning one's thoughts proceed
according to certain sorts of rules:

that is, according to rules having

to do with the logical features of thought, as opposed to, say, associ-

ations arising from past experience or resemblances between the "material

qualities" of various thoughts.

Whether the subject's thoughts are so

related will depend upon what is thought, i.e., upon whether the statements expressed in one's thoughts do follow according to some set of
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rules, rather than upon the subject's
intention to reason according to
such rules.

Thus, one's justification for believing
that a sequence of

thoughts conforms to certain principles
ultimately depends upon an
analysis of the argument expressed in those
thoughts.

The discovery

that the statements expressed do constitute
an argument according to a

particular set of rules will tend to confirm the
claim that the sequence
of thoughts in which this argument is expressed
counts as an instance of

reasoning
One might object to the above argument on the following
grounds: It
is frequently very difficult to determine by
exactly what logical

principles one's thoughts are connected.

Indeed, it is an intellectual

accomplishment of the highest order to elucidate the general
principles

governing ordinary forms of inference, and we are not now in a position
to so elucidate many forms of inference.

It seems unwise, therefore, to

require that the subject know by what principles his reasoning proceeds
in order to know that he is reasoning.

ment is too strong.

Peirce denies that this require-

He recognizes that people can engage in inference

without knowledge of the principles of that inference.
that such cases do not involve reasoning

,

But he argues

strictly speaking.

1

"Such a

Such a discovery does not conclusively establish that the subject
reasons. Whether the subject is reasoning unlike the question of
whether his thoughts are related according to a set of rules, does
depend upon the subject's intentions and intellectual dispositions.
A student reciting from memory a passage in a logic text may be entertaining a sequence of thoughts related according to a set of rules
but his recitation will not constitute reasoning unless, for example,
it is done attentively, with understanding, or with the intention to
demonstrate some conclusion. Imagine someone constructing a rhyming
syllogism in order to produce a poem.
,

TO

process,
i nference

he says,
"
,

5

.

"should he called, not reasoning, hut an acritical

UUl (issues of Pragmatic ism)

.

According to Peirce the

subject cannot know that he is reasoning unless he has
knowledge of the

principles on which his reasoning is based, because he denies
that the
subject can be said to reason at all in the absence of
such knowledge.

Whatever the justice of Peirce's contention, one need not insist
on
his view of reasoning for the sake of the argument against immediate

knowledge of cognitions.

That argument requires only that the subject

be warranted in believing that his thoughts are related by some principles of inference.

He need not know by which principles.

The rationale

for this requirement is that the subject could not plausibly be said to

possess any conception of reasoning unless he realizes that reasoning
involves some principles by which different thoughts are connected.

Presumably the subject cannot know that he reasons unless he possesses
some recognizable conception of what it is to reason.

Perhaps one need

not know what it is to reason in order to reason, just as, perhaps, one

need not know that one is reasoning in order to reason.

But this

observation does not tell against the claim that one cannot be justified
in believing that one reasons, unless one is also justified in believing

that one's thoughts, in this instance, are related by some sort of

principles
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Introspection and emotion

The foregoing discussion shows that Peirce has
a plausible argument

against the claim that one knows immediately that
one is thinking or
reasoning.

He wants to establish that one lacks immediate
knowledge

regarding any mode of thought.
quences,

Judging from his procedure in "Conse-

he believes he can establish this more general
conclusion by

first assimilating the other modes of thought to cognition
and then

appealing to his earlier demonstration that cognitions cannot be
known

by direct perception.
that one intends

,

Thus, his argument that one cannot know intuitively

or wills

,

or that one is in a particular sort of

emotional state, for example, seems to depend upon whether he succeeds
in reducing all types of mental activity to cognition.

As we shall see,

his argument must be more complicated that this presentation suggests.
In "Consequences," 5-291-.298, Peirce undertakes to show that

"every sort of modification of consciousness is an inference"

Actually, he discusses only sensation, emotion, and attention.

(

5

.

298

).

Since

the cost in time and pages of adequate treatment even of these three is

prohibitive,

I

shall focus on what Peirce regarded as the hardest case

for his theory, the emotions, and confine myself to a few brief remarks

on sensation and attention.

My account of his views on the emotion will

illustrate Peirce’s general strategy and indicate the sorts of problems
it encounters.

Turning first to sensation, we must understand the difference
between sensation and feeling.

Peirce makes this task more difficult
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than it need be by occasionally talking about "sensations”
when he means

"feelings."

He uses "sensation" in this way in "Consequences"

Every thought

sensation

.

.

.

.

(1890), he says.

289

,

Similarly in "A Guess at the Riddle”

We know that there is no resemblance between memory

and sensation, because
(1.379).

.

is, so far as it is immediately present, a mere

a mere feeling."

.

5

.

.

.

nothing can resemble an immediate feeling"

(For other instances see 1.308, 1.310, and 5-395.)

In "Conse-

quences" 5.291, however, "sensation" refers to a mode of thought involving
the judgment that an object has some quality.

This judgmental account

of sensation reappears in "Questions" 5.21+5 and in "How to Make Our

Ideas Clear" where Peirce remarks that "All sensations

consciousness in the form of beliefs" (5-1+06).

.

.

.

emerge into

On this view sensations

are similar to, if not identical with, what he later calls "perceptual

judgments," 5.115-.H6, Lectures on Pragmatism (1903).
completeness,

I

For the sake of

should add that he eventually adopts still another

account according to which a sensation consists of two elements, a

feeling and "the consciousness of being compelled" to have that feeling
7 . 5^3

.

Peirce's argument in "Consequences" 5-291 that sensation involves

inference proceeds in much the same way as his argument regarding the
emotions.

Indeed, he says in 5-292 that the same sort of thinking

occurs in both sensation and emotion, and that the two modes are to be

distinguished by reference to the kinds of bodily "motions" to which
each gives rise.

For this reason, my presentation of his views on

emotion will serve to indicate how he deals with sensation.
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ihe remarks on attention,

5

*295- -297

,

raise a number of problems.

Peirce offers a very different story about attention than he tells
about

sensation and emotion.

Attention is not a kind of thinking at all,

rather "attention is the power by which thought at one time is connected

with or made to relate to thought at another time" (5.295).

Nevertheless,

he maintains that attending involves a process of enumerative induction.

Attention is roused when the same phenomenon
presents itself repeatedly on different
occasions, or the same predicate in different
subjects.
We see that A has a certain character, that B has the same, that C has the same,
so that we say, "These have this character."
Thus attention is an act of induction; but it
is an induction which does not increase our
knowledge, because our "these" covers nothing
but the instances experienced.
It is, in
short, an argument from enumeration. (5.296)
This attempt to portray the attending as a kind of induction is rather

strained.

One would think that attention is as likely to be roused by

novelty or dissimilarity as by the recurrence of some phenomenon or predicate.

Doubtless Peirce adopts the account he does because he equates

attention with the power of abstraction,
doubts in its own right.

5

-295, hut that equation raises

It seems the better part of valor to forbear

further discussion of Peirce's views on attention.

Proceeding with the account of emotion, Peirce writes in
There is no feeling which is not also a representation, a predicate of something determined
logically by the feelings which precede it. For
if there are any such feelings not predicates,
they are the emotions. Now every emotion has a
It a man is angry, he is saying to
subject.
himself that this or that is vile and outIf he is in joy, he is saying "This
rageous.
... In short, whenever a
is delicious."
man feels, he is thinking of something.

5

*

292

:

5.292 calls to mind the view Peirce expressed
in Question Four,

5.22,, that every emotion has a "subject," i.e., an
object, and consists
in a judgment that something has a certain
property.

thus far suggests that emotions are inferences.

But, nothing said

His argument for this

claim apparently comes in a passage immediately following
the one quoted
above
The emotions as a little observation will
show, arise when our attention is strongly
drawn towards complex and inconceivable circumstances.
Fear arises when we cannot predict
our fate. ... If there are some indications
that something greatly for my interest and
which I have anticipated would happen, may
not happen; and if, after weighing probabilities
I find myself unable to come to any fixed
conclusion in reference to the future, in place
of the intellectual hypothetic inference which
I seek, the feeling of anxiety arises.
When
something happens for which I cannot account,
I wonder
Thus an emotion is always a
simple predicate substituted by an operation
of the mind for a highly complicated predicate.
(5.292)
,

,

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

A careful reading of the above passage reveals that Peirce does not,
in fact, maintain that emotions are inferences.

He asserts rather that

they arise by a process similar in some respects to hypothetical reasoning.
What he claims later in 5.292 is merely that "the analogy of the parts

played by emotion and hypothesis is very striking."

He compares the

emotion to the hypothesis in a hypothetical inference and not to the
inference as a whole.

Thus, his final account in "Consequences" seems to

be that an emotion is a judgment that arises from other thoughts in a way

analogous to hypothetical inference.

2

2

For a discussion of Peirce’s theory of the emotion more detailed
than the one I shall present, I refer the reader to David Cavan*
"C. S. Peirce's Semiotic Theory of Emotion," Proceedings of the
International Peirce Congress, Amsterdam, 1976 forthcoming.
,
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Though Peirce affirms that emotions are judgments, he does
not deny
that they involve feelings

.

In general

,

he holds that any thought

considered simply as an episode in consciousness, is a feeling,
and
throughout the passages quoted he refers to emotions as feelings.
are not, however, merely feelings.

They

They exhibit the rational features

distinctive of thoughts: representation, predication, and interpretation. These features figure importantly in Peirce's argument that the

emotions are not merely various kinds of feelings.

A feeling, as such,

is simply an immediate consciousness of some quality.

It has no rational

relationship to any thought and it signifies nothing beyond itself.
Since emotions are both rationally related to other thoughts and directed

toward objects, they cannot be mere feelings.
Peirce’s theory of the emotions immediately encounters two objections. The first, and more limited of these objections, is that some

emotions, moods such as melancholy, for example, seem not to be directed

toward any particular object.

I

to this objection in Chapter II.

have already discussed Peirce's answer
He regards melancholy as a disposition

to attribute some quality, a peculiar deadness, perhaps, to the objects
one experiences while the mood persists.

Though the melancholy man does

not judge that some particular object is the thing about which he is

melancholy, his mood does involve a tendency to make certain sorts of
judgments. This approach seems plausible.

In any case, most emotional

states do involve the idea of some object toward which one directs one's

feelings

76

The second, more radical objection, denies that emotions involve

judgments.

Infants and brutes are often said to have emotions, but it

seems unlikely

thoughts.

,

particularly in the case of brutes

that they have any

One might reject the claim that animals have emotions, but

Peirce forecloses this option.
emotions of affection as
horse and

,

I

I

.

.

"My dog," he asserts, "has the same
.

.

You would never persuade me that my

do not sympathize, or that the canary bird

feel with me" (I.31U "Lectures on 'Pragmatism")

.

.

.

does not

.

Given his account of

emotion, then, Peirce apparently ascribes thoughts to his dog and his
horse.

Such ascriptions of thought strike many philosophers as very

implausible. Their objections usually boil down to contention that

thought in some way requires langauge and the observation that, except

perhaps in a few special cases, e.g.

,

apes who have learned human sign

language, animals possess nothing properly called a language.

There are several such arguments in the literature.

I

shall

consider a version presented by Bruce Aune. J
In thinking (as cats are often said to do) that
the mouse will run into its hole as soon as it
sees you, the agent is conceptualizing a situation
in a particular way; he is distinguishing items
of reality in just the way that these items are
distinguished by men who use such words as "mouse,"
"hole," "run," "see," and "you." If, consequently,
we are to credit the cat with the literal ability
to entertain the thought just mentioned ... we
must also credit it with a whole battery of thing,
activity, and semantic concepts. Yet we have the
best of reasons for believing that these concepts

3

Bruce Aune
219-220.

,

Knowledge

,

Mind, and Mature

.

New York, 1967

,

pp.
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could not "be attained without mastery of a very
complicated language
indeed, a language that
is formally analogous to our own.
Surely no one
with a clear head would actually want to credit
lower animals with conceptual schemes of this
sort

—

Peirce would certainly agree with Aune

'

s

point that one cannot

reasonably attribute a particular thought to a subject unless one also

grants that the subject has a conceptual system within which to interpret and fix the denotation of the thought in question.

It is not clear

how complicated a language a beast must possess in order to master a
conceptual system sufficient for thinking some thought formally analogous to the thought that something is vile, or delicious, for example.

Nevertheless, even the suggestion that dogs and horses possess

a

very

simple language and correspondingly simple conceptual system seems

highly speculative at best.
Putting aside for the moment Peirce’s commitment to the thoughts of
animals, let us ask on what grounds people attribute emotions to animal. s
One reason, stated crudely, is that animals look as though they have

emotions.

That is, they exhibit facial expressions and patterns of

behavior similar to those exhibited by human beings undergoing certain
emotional experiences.

A more general reason is that some instances of

animal behavior can be explained on the supposition that they have
emotions.

(I

explained.")

am not assuming here that "explained" means "correctly

But these are the same sorts of grounds people give for

ascribing thoughts to animals.

An ape’s facial expression may sometimes

resemble that of an angry man, but it may also resemble the expression
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of a roan

Likewise

vh,G

,

is curious, or puzzled, or cogitating on some problem.

just as the hypothesis that a dog is afraid or happy may

his behavior

,

so the supposition that a dog knows, remembers, or

infers something may explain, for example, his ability to find his way

home from a strange place.

The evolutionary argument that human abili-

ties differ only in degree from the capacities of lower animals also

applies to both emotion and cognition.
It seems then that our evidence for ascribing emotions to animals
is not much better, or much worse, than our evidence that they think.

One might maintain that, since emotions are only feelings, and since one

needs no linguistic competence in order to feel, it is less implausible
to believe that animals have emotions than that they think.

emotions are only feelings is the point at issue.
views on the emotions of animals

,

But whether

Whatever Peirce's own

the supposition that animals have

emotions does not lead to a decisive objection against Peirce's theory
of the emotions. One's decision about whether brutes have emotion

depends in part on what one thinks emotions are.

Supposing that emotions are not merely feelings, what are they

according to Peirce?
"Consequences."

No clear answer to this question emerges from

It will not do to characterize anger, for instance,

simply by reference to the judgment that something is vile, abominable,
or outrageous.

The judgment that something is vile occurs in a variety

of different emotional states.

disdain rather than anger.

It often expresses cool contempt or

Given someone with the right (or the wrong)
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sort of character, the Marquis de Sade comes to
mind, that judgment might

indicate pleasure.

Likewise, one may judge that something is out-

rageous, i.e., worthy of outrage or tending to evoke outrage,
without

being ouoraged at the time one so judges

,

Anger involves more than

thinking that a thing is vile or outrageous.

Presumably Peirce regards

the occurrence of a judgment such as ’This thing is vile’ as a necessary

condition for the subject’s being angry.

But he does not say what

conditions he considers necessary and sufficient for anger.

Though he does not offer an analysis of any emotion, Peirce clearly
maintains that every instance of an emotion involves some thought.

It

may seem that this is all he needs in order to show that we have no
immediate knowledge of our emotional states.

His earlier argument

establishes that we have no immediate knowledge of thoughts and his

theory of the emotions indicates that every emotion involves a thought.
But a problem arises here.

To say that emotions are thoughts is not to

say that they must be known

as_

thoughts

.

concerning intuitive knowledge of thoughts

According to Peirce's argument
,

one cannot know that some-

thing is a thought unless one is justified in believing that it bears
certain relations to other thoughts.
instance of emotion is a thought

,

This shows that to know that an

one must be justified in ascribing to

it certain connections with other thoughts.

He has not yet shown,

however, that in order to recognize that one is angry, or in some other

kind of emotional state, one must know that one’s current mental state
is a thought.

Indeed, this supposition appears doubtful.

It seems that
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a man who "believes that emotions are merely feeling
could know whether

he is angry, or happy, or in a state of anxiety.
In 01 der to apply the sort of argument he used regarding knowledge

of cognitions

Peirce needs to establish that one cannot know that one

,

is in a given emotional state unless one is justified in believing that

this state has certain sorts of connections with other thoughts.

whether he can provide a plausible argument here,

I

To see

shall return to the

problem of formulating necessary and sufficient conditions for someone’s

being angry.

I

do not propose to offer Peirce’s analysis of anger, or

even an analysis.

I

hope, rather, to make certain points about what one

needs to know in order to know that one is angry.
I

have already argued that having the thought that something is

vile is not a sufficient condition for being angry.

Supposing that it

is a necessary condition, what more does anger involve?

"Consequences" suggest three sorts of further conditions.

Remarks in
First, Peirce

says that, "That which distinguishes both sensations and emotions proper

from the feeling of a thought, is that in the case of the former two the

material quality is made prominent" (5.29^). Extending this comment a
little, one might contend that what distinguishes angrily thinking that

something is vile from dispassionate occurrences of the same thought is
that in the former case the subject attends particularly to the material

qualities, i.e., qualities of feeling, associated with the thought.

Taking this a step further, one might mark-off instances of anger from
instances of other sorts of emotional states by reference to some special

8l

quality cf feeling accompanying all and only instances of anger.
Peirce does say that there is a quality of feeling characteristic
of anger.

In "C

S.

.

Peirce’s Semiotic Theory of Emotion," David Savan

maintains that Peirce unequivocally rejects any such suggestion.

According to Savan, he denies that "immediate feelings can distinguish
annoyance from joy, or from any other emotional state."'* 1

Savan bases

this claim on an argument that, according to Peirce, "all immediate

feelings are alike."

interpretation.

shall not consider Savan

I

’s

argument for his

A few quotations will suffice to show that Peirce is by

no means uniformly hostile to the claim that different modes of thought

may be distinguished by reference to qualities of feeling.

In the Logic

of 1873 he writes:
Doubt and belief are two states of mind which
feel different , so that we can distinguish
them by immediate sensation. (7-313)

Closer to home, he remarks under Question Three in his earlier essay of

1868 that "We can unquestionably distinguish a belief from a conception,
in most cases, by means of a particular feeling of conviction" (5-242).
If belief and doubt can be so distinguished, why not anger and contempt?

Perhaps Savan discovers an inconsistency in Peirce's views about immediate feelings.

He does not show that Peirce must deny that various types

of emotions exhibit characteristic differences in qualities of feeling.

Whatever Peirce would say about the above proposal, is it plausible
in its own right?

Savan

,

ojd

.

It does seem that various sorts of feeling usually

cit

.

,

p

.

6
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accompany anger.

People frequently describe that emotion in terms

having to do with fire or heat.
simmers with the emotion.
anger?

Anger flares up:

one burns, boils, or

But do such feelings arise only in case of

A man may burn with anger, but also with curiosity.

flares up and simmers.

Excitement

Suppose that the subject takes something to be

vile and at the same time experiences a hot, burning feeling.

Does this

supposition guarantee that the subject is angry about the thing in
question?

It is not clear that it does.

Given a certain sort of

emotional constitution one might be intensely curious or excited by that

which is vile.

The thought that something is vile may occur to a man

burning with excitement or curiosity rather than with anger.
Perhaps our use of terms such as "burning" to desribe both curiosity and anger merely indicates that our vocabulary fails to capture

certain fine distinctions among feelings.

problem in itself.

If so, that represents a

In order to characterize anger as a kind of thought

accompanied by a certain sort of feeling, one needs to say what sort of
feeling.

It is notoriously difficult to describe precisely the feelings

associated with emotional states.

This problem makes it doubtful that

one can provide necessary and sufficient conditions for anger by refer-

ence to qualities of feeling.

Some comments in 5.293 suggest a second approach.

There Peirce

distinguishes emotion from sensation by noting that certain "animal

motions" accompany the former but not the latter.
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The animal motions to which I allude are, in
the first place and obviously, blushing,
blenching, staring, smiling, scowling,
.,
etc., etc.
To these may, perhaps, be added,
in the second place, other more complicated
actions.
.

.

.

.

,

Among the animal motions produced by the various emotional states

,

one

might try to discover certain sorts of overt bodily symptoms characteristic of anger.

If successful, one might propose that the subject is angry

if, and only if, he judges that something is vile and certain animal

motions accompany his judgment.

Though

I

shall not explore any such account in detail, the above

proposal appears unpromising.

Even supposing that the subject cannot be

angry without exhibiting some overt symptoms

,

he can be angry without

exhibiting any particular set of symptoms one can describe solely by
reference to overt bodily changes.

(It would not be very informative to

say merely that a man is angry if, and only if, he exhibits the sorts
of overt symptoms associated with anger.)

The subject can get angry

without scowling, clenching his fists, gnashing his teeth, turning red,
or physically attacking the object of his anger.

Further, many bodily

symptoms associated with anger appear in connection with other emotions
as well.

A man in the grip of excitement may turn red, grind his teeth,

and pound his companions with his fists.

In short, the prospects for

distinguishing anger from other emotional states by reference to associated animal motions appear bleak.
In "Consequences" Peirce hints at yet another approach.

In 5-292

he characterizes anxiety as an emotion arising as a result of certain
sorts of thoughts

.

3U

if thei e are some indications that something
greatly for my interest, and which I have
anticipated would happen, may not happen;
and after weighing probabilities
I
find myself unable to come to any fixed
conclusion in reference to the future, in
place of the intellectual hypothetic inference
which I seek, the feeling of anxiety arises
,

.

.

.

This suggests that one might be able to distinguish among
the different

emotions by reference to the sorts of thoughts from which they
arise.

How to Make Our Ideas Clear" (1878) contains another hint in this
direction.

There Peirce writes that the various modes of thought "are

distinguished by having different motives, ideas, or functions"

(5.396).

One might put this by saying that what distinguishes an instance of

anger from instances of other emotions is the context of thought in

which it occurs.

Instances of anger are characteristically motivated by

the thought that one, or something in which one takes an interest, has

been threatened, injured, or wronged.

Thus, although contempt may

involve the same sort of judgment as anger, "That thing is vile," e.g.,
one can distinguish between instances of the two emotions by reference

to the sorts of thoughts that precede that judgment.

One may also discriminate anger from other emotions by reference to

thoughts consequent upon the emotion.

Imagine, for example, that a

sadist observes the neighborhood bully twisting a child's arm.

He

believes that the child is being wronged and he thinks it vile, but
these thoughts excite rather than anger him.

In the case imagined, the

subject's initial thoughts, and perhaps even his feelings, are of a sort
that might occur in anger.

Nevertheless, differences between anger and
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sadistic excitement may emerge when one considers
subsequent thought.

The sadist, since he takes pleasure in the bully's
action, presumably

wishes that it continue.

The angry man, by contrast, will be disposed

to search for a means to end it.

That is, he will have certain thoughts

directed toward punishing the bully or making him desist.
It seems preferable to talk about subsequent thoughts rather
than
ovei t actions

in.

this context, because the suoject may be angry with the

bully ana yet take no overt action against him.

However, it does seem

plausible to suppose that, whether or not the subject acts overtly, he

will at least desire that the bully stop and consider what he might do
to accomplish this end.

Perhaps an appropriate course of action will

occur to him immediately and he will act on it straight-away

.

Perhaps

he will be paralyzed by fear or will decide that other matters more

urgently require his attention and so refrain from taking any action.
For similar reason, he may suppress other overt symptoms of his anger.
I

shall not attempt to work out an analysis of anger along the

lines suggested above.

My primary concern is to see whether Peirce can

plausibly deploy against the claim that one knows immediately the nature
of one’s emotional states an argument similar to his argument against

immediate knowledge of thoughts.
reason to believe that he can.
of thoughts.

The foregoing discussion provides

Recall the argument concerning knowledge

Peirce maintains that, in order to know that some mental

content is a thought, one must be justified in ascribing to it certain
sorts of connections with other thoughts

.

In the case of the emotion
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anger

m

5

a similar claim seems reasonable.

Can the subject be justified

believing that he is angry rather than, say, contemptuous
or excited,

merely on the basis of an inspection of a present
thought or feeling?
The presence of a particular sort of thought or feeling
does not reli-

ably distinguish anger from the latter two states.

Whether the subject

is justified in regarding a given mental state as an
instance of anger

depends, at least in part, upon what he is justified in believing
about
the context of thought in which it occurs.

Whether the judgment that

something is vile arises from the belief that someone has been injured
or wronged, or in the course of a merely aesthetic appraisal, is a

factor the subject should take into account in deciding whether that
judgment expresses anger rather than contempt.

To know that he is

burning with anger and not with curiosity or excitement, he needs to
know something about the thinking which precedes or flows from his
current state.
Thus it seems reasonable for Peirce to deny that one can know

immediately whether one is angry.

Statements describing the context of

thought in which an emotion state occurs do serve as evidence for the
truth or falsity of the claim that one is angry.

Further, it is reason-

able to suppose that the subject is not justified in believing that he
is angry unless he is also justified in accepting some such evidence.

Finally, it does not seem reasonable to suppose that the subject could
be justified in believing that his current mental state occurs within a

certain context of thought merely by virtue of his being in or being
conscious of the mental state in question.

87

I

should emphasize that the argument

i

have envisioned for Peirce

does not require that he able to provide necessary and
sufficient

conditions for someone's "being angry solely

"by

reference connections

between instances of that emotion and other thoughts.
argument is concerned

,

So far as that

the correct analysis of "anger" might involve

reference to qualities of feeling or animal motion.
be a mere leeling rather than a thought.

Indeed, anger might

The argument requires only

that whatever anger may be, it is recognizable as anger only in the

context of certain sorts of thoughts

.

I

have discussed how one might

state necessary and sufficient conditions for someone's being angry only
as a way of showing that it is reasonable to suppose that the subject

must be justified in believing certain things about his other thoughts
in order to know that he is angry.

The foregoing discussion suggests a general strategy Peirce might

employ in arguing against the Cartesian account of our knowledge of the

various modes of thought.

In essence, this strategy consists in arguing

that the distinguishing features of any mode of thought are relational:
that is, in order to know that one is engaged in a particular sort of

mental activity, one must be justified in accepting certain statements
concerning the relation of present contents of mind to things no longer
or not yet present.

Peirce adopts this strategy in his discussion of

thought and cognition and
a particular emotion.

I

have tried to show how he might apply it to

To decide whether he would successfully extend

the sort of argument suggested to volition, intention, or to the other
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emotion requires a case by case examination.

Nevertheless, the argument

in the caoe of anger indicates that he has some prospect
of success.

CHAPTER

V

KNOWLEDGE of the internal as internal

The notion of introspection in Peirce's post-1868 works differs

from that employed in "Questions."

introspection,

I

Under Question Four he says, "By

mean a direct perception of the internal world, but not

necessarily a perception of it as internal" (5.2UU).

His remark indi-

cates that introspective knowledge of internal phenomena need not involve
the knowledge that those phenomena belong to the inner world.

This

account contrasts both with the only definition of introspection
find in his later works

—

I

can

"Introspection is the direct observation of

the operations of mind as mental operations" (7.376)

whole tenor of his later discussion of the topic.

—

and with the

The following quota-

tions, taken respectively from Minute Logic (1902), "Issues of Pragmatism"
(1905), ana a review of Pearson's Grammar of Science (1901), provide a

representative sample of that discussion.
I must confess myself to be of that party
which thinks that no psychical fact, as such,
Everything in the
can be observed.
psychical sciences is inferential. Not the
smallest fact about the mind can be directly
perceived as psychical. (1.250)
.

.

.

Introspection is wholly a matter of inference.
One is immediately conscious of feelings, no
doubt , but not that they are feelings of an
ego ,
5 .^ 62 )
(

In a certain sense there is such a thing as
introspection: but it consists in an interpretation of phenomena presenting themselves
We first see red and
as external percepts
.
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blue things.
It is quite a discovery when we
find that the eye has anything to do with
them, and a discovery still more recondite
when we learn that there is an ego_ behind the
eye, to which these qualities properly belong.
(

8 . 14

)

4

)

Each of the preceding passages concerns the subject’s knowledge of
the psychical as psychical.

It is precisely this sort of knowledge

Peirce regards as inferential.

He takes it for granted that the subject

has knowledge of or, at any rate, is conscious of qualities of feeling.

What he maintains is that the subject does not know immediately that
such qualities belong to "an ego behind the eye," that they are a part
of the subject’s inner world.
In the present chapter, I shall explore Peirce's reasons for

holding that we do not know immediately that internal phenomena are
internal. The view that we have no immediate knowledge of the internal
as internal must not be confused with the doctrine

Externalization Thesis.

I

earlier called The

The Externalization Thesis asserts that the

subject initially ascribes qualities of feeling to external objects.

As

such, it is a psychological thesis and makes no claim about knowledge.

The view

I

shall consider here concerns, not how the subject comes to

attribute qualities of feeling to himself, but what justifies such
attributions. Nor shall

I

confine my discussion to qualities of feelings.

The question at issue is whether the subject knows intuitively that any

feature of his inner world, be it a feeling, activity, or state, belongs
to that world. After

I

have discussed Peirce’s argument against immedi-

ate knowledge of the internal as internal,

I

shall inquire whether he

can use that argument to rescue a restricted version of his claim that
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inner knowledge derives from external facts.

Internality and externality

Before considering what sorts of evidence might be
relevant to the
judgment that a phenomenon belongs to the inner world, one
needs to know

what it is for something to belong to that world.

Peirce examines the

notion of internality, and its compliment, externality, at
some length.
The earliest detailed discussion appearing in the Collected Papers
occur
in an untitled manuscript, circa 1873.

That is external to the mind which is what it
is, whatever our thoughts may be on any subject
just as that is real which is what it
is, whatever our thoughts may be concerning
that particular thing.
Thus an emotion is
real, in the sense that it exists in the mind
whether we are distinctly conscious of it or
not.
But, it is not external because although
it does not depend upon what we think about
it, it does depend upon the state of our
thought about something. (7-339)
:

,

He reiterates this position in "How to Make Our Ideas Clear."

distinguishes figments, reals, and externals.
A figment is a product of somebody's imagination:
it has such characters as his thought
impresses upon it. That whose characters are
independent of how you or I think is an
external reality. There are, however,
phenomena within our own minds dependent
upon our thought, which are at the same time
real in the sense that we really think them.
But though their characters depend upon how
we think, they do not depend upon what we
think those characters to be. (5-^05)
,

Here he
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The above passages suggest that the external is that
which is in-

dependent of, the internal that which is dependent upon,
"the state of
our thought.

nality.

The passages define non-relative internality and exter-

Presumably, that which is internal relative to a given person

is that which depends upon the thought of the person in question.

for Peirce

internality is thought— dependence

,

independence

Thus,

externality thought-

,

.

This way of characterizing the internal and the external requires

explanation.
what they are

artifacts

—

-

Many unproblematic ally external objects exist and ’are
1

because someone had certain thoughts:

for example,

things constructed with certain intentions or purposes

and bodily movements resulting from volition or emotion.

I

—

do not think

that Peirce wants to consign such things to the inner world, though in
some sense they depend upon someone’s thought.
It may seem that the problem just mentioned is easily disposed of,

but it raises a larger issue for Peirce than one might suppose.

Peirce

denies that anything that can be conceived or known is entirely thought-

independent

.

But, if it be asked us whether some realities
do not exist which are entirely independent of
thought; I would in turn ask what is meant by
such an expression and what can be meant by it
... It is clear that it is quite beyond the
power of the mind to have an idea of something
and
entirely independent of thought ,
since there is no such idea, there is no mean(7.3^5 Same source
ing in the expression.
as 7.339 o n preceding page.)
.

.

.
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The view expressed above represents an enduring
feature of Peirce’s

metaphysics.

In "Questions," 1868, he writes, "If I think

will not go so far as Berkeley and say that
hut

I

will say that what

I

I

think of a person seeing,

I

think of is in the nature of a cognition, and

so of anything else that can he experience"

later, "Some Amazing Mazes:

'white'

(

5

.

257

).

Forty-one years

Fourth Curiosity" reaffirms that, "what we

think of cannot possibly he of a different nature than thought itself"
(6.339).

Thus, if the external is that which is entirely thought-

independent, Peirce seems to deny that we can know or even conceive of
external things. But, his works contain numerous passages suggesting
that we have knowledge of an external world.

This problem probably

explains the diffidence concerning the existence of an external world he

expresses in Question Four, 5.2UU.
Peirce attempts to deal with the problem raised above by intro-

ducing a subtle distinction between what, in the language of "Question"
5.2U7, "is relative to human nature or to mind in general" and what is

relative to some mind or minds in particular.

He introduces this distinc-

tion into his treatment of internality and externality in a discussion
of color in "Some Amazing Mazes," 1909

.

Any object whose attributes, i.e., all that
may truly be predicated, or asserted of it,
will, and always would, remain exactly what
they are unchanged though you or I or any
man or men should think, or should have
thought as variously as you please, I term
external in contradistinction to mental For
example, a dream is mental, because it
depends upon what passed in the thoughts of
the dreamer whether it be true that the dream
,

,

,

.

9^

vas of a dog, or was of the Round Table of
King Arthur, or of anything else. On the
other hand, the colors of human experience
and in particular the contrast between the
colors of the petals of a Jaqueminot rose and
that of the leaves of the bush, although it
is relative to the sense of sight, is not
mental, in my sense of that word. (6.327)

By saying that color is relative to the sense of sight, he means
that the various color terms are defined by reference to "normal

chromatic sensations."

Sensations are thoughts:

hence

,

color terms are

defined by reference to something mental, and whether a given object is
red, for example, would seem in some way to depend upon how human beings

think

,

in Peirce's broad sense of "think."

However, he maintains

,

what

is meant by normal chromatic sense is not "the average" of all the

chromatic sensations that people have had or will have,

"The normal

,"

he writes, "is not the average of what actually occurs. but of what

would occur, in the long run, under certain circumstances" (6.327).
Colors are relative to thought, but not to what particular people do.
did, or will think.

Peirce concludes:

what I mean by external might
vary with how persons of a given general
description would think under supposable
but , it will not vary with
circumstances
how any finite body of individuals have thought,
(6.327)
do now think, or will actually think.
So, in general

,

:

I

am not interested in the theory of color propounded above, but in

the conception of externality.

Peirce has made clear that the thought-

independence which characterizes the external world concerns the actual
thoughts of particular persons.

There may be some sorts of things which
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can be conceived only by reference to mind,

nevertheless, such things

can be external provided that their "attributes

they are

,

•

*

•

though you or

I

.

.

remain exactly as

.

or any man or men should think

should have thought as variously as you please."

,

or

A thing may be relative

to mind, without being dependent upon particular minds.
Tnis new characterization of externality does nothing, however,
to

resolve the first problem mentioned.

Indeed, it makes it possible to

state that problem in a more serious form.

Peirce calls external, "any

object whose attributes, i.e., all that may truly be predicated of it,

will, and always would, remain exactly what they are
I

.

.

.

though you or

or any man or men should think, or should have thought as variously as

you please" (6.327).

Given this account, it seems that nothing which

is, or will be, an object of human thought is external.

the problem here, let us consider Pike's Peak, presumably

To illustrate
a.

paradigmatic

external object, and the predicate "is admired by all Americans."

Whether this predicate truly applies to Pike's Peak depends upon the
attitudes of present Americans toward that mountain.

If it is truly

admired by all Americans, it has that attribute because you and
various other persons have certain thoughts.

I

and

Should some American cease

to admire Pike's Peak, the mountain would lose the attribute in question.

Apparently then, given the account of externality in 6.327, Peirce would
consign Pike's Peak to the internal world.

A similar case can be made

regarding anything that is or could be an object of thought.

Peirce

denies that one can meaningfully talk about something which could not be
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an object of thought.

previously cited 7.339-

(See "Questions" 5. 254 -. 258 in addition to the
It seems, therefore, that nothing one can

meaningfully discuss or think about is external in the sense of that
term defined in 6.327.
Despite his belief that anything thought about somehow partakes of
the nature of thought, Peirce would not welcome the above conclusion. He

intends in 6.327 to develop a serviceable way of distinguishing among
the possible objects of thought which things are external and which

mental.

He undertakes his discussion of color precisely in order to

show that colors belong to the external rather than to the internal
world.

That discussion fails to uncover an adequate criterion for

externality
I

above.

do not know how Peirce would have dealt with the objection raised

There are, however, several ways of distinguishing the internal

and the external which avoid the difficulties just mentioned while

remaining faithful to his basic approach.

For example, one might

characterize the thought-dependence of things internal by reference to
the conditions necessary for their existence rather than by considering
all that may be truly predicated of them.

Let us say that an internal

phenomenon is one which exists at a given time t just in case someone
thinks or is disposed to have certain thoughts at t.

(Here "things"

and "thoughts" should be taken in Peirce's broad sense of those terms.)
I

have used the disjunction, "thinks or is disposed to have certain

thoughts," because some internal phenomena are such that they may exist
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in the suoject at times when he is net mentally
active.

We may say of

a man asleep or temporarily unconscious that he desires
to

believes thao he is king, for instance.

"be

king or

Such states are plausibly

conceivea as dispositions to have certain occurrent desires or
beliefs
under appropriate conditions.

Thus, on the account here presented they

are internal phenomena.

An external object is a thing which can exist at a time
no one thinks at t or is disposed to do so.

t even

though

The need to account for the

externality of artifacts explains the introduction of a temporal variable
in the above formulations.

One might hold that a work of art cannot

come into existence unless someone has had certain thoughts.
for such a claim would be,

I

The grounds

suppose, that something cannot be a work of

art unless it was produced with, or as a result of, certain intentions.
If this claim be accepted, then the assertion that a work of art exists

entails that someone has thought.

Nevertheless, once a piece of art

has been created it can continue to exist regardless of anyone's thoughts.

Thus, artifacts count as external objects because they can exist at times

when no one thinks or is disposed to have any thoughts.

Adopting the above criterion, Peirce can allow that a thing is an
object of thought without thereby consigning it to the inner world.

Though some of its attributes depend upon how particular people think.
Pike's Peak remains firmly grounded in the external world since it can
exist however anyone may think.

Other characterizations of internality

and externality might serve as well, but the account offered is a

fairly obvious development of Peirce's own account which meets the

objections previously mentioned.
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I

should point out that the notions defined above
are non-relative

To define internality and externality relative
to a particular person,
one merely replaces "someone" and "no one" in
the foregoing definitions

with the name of the person in question.

For a phenomenon to belong to

the inner world of a particular individual is for it
to be dependent

upon that person's thoughts.
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Evidence for internality

The preceding section explains what Peirce means by saying that

something is internal or mental.

I

shall now consider his account of

how one knows whether a phenomenon belongs to one

’

s

inner world

Descartes believed that little could be said in answer to the question
here raised.
What then am I? A conscious being. What is
that? A being that doubts, understands, asserts,
denies, is willing, is unwilling; further, that
has sense and imagination.
These are a good
many properties - if only they all belong to
me.
But how can they fail to? Am I not the
very person who is not doubting
who underwho is willing,
stands
and asserts,
Even if I am asleep,
who imagines.
even if my creator does all he can to deceive me;
how can any of these things be less of a fact
than my existence? Is any of these something
distinct from my consciousness? Can any of them
be called a separate thing from myself? It is
that I cannot think how to explain
so clear
it more clear ly.^
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Descartes apparently regards "Is any of these something distinct
from my consciousness?" as a rhetorical question;

question seriously.

Peirce takes that

Peirce argues that one cannot tell intuitively

whether a particular phenomenon belongs to one's Internal world and that
several kinds of evidence bear on the hypothesis that a thing is internal.

In "A Guess at the Riddle", 1890

,

he writes:

The only consciousness we have of /activity J
We are conscious
is the sense of resistance.
But whether the activity
of meeting with a fact.
.

.

.

.

.

.

Descartes Philosophical Writings translated and edited by
New fork, 1971 PP* 70— fl.
G.E.M. Anscombe and P.T. Geach
l-Rene

,

,

.

»
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is within on without we know only "by secondary signs
and not by our original faculty of recognizing fact.
(1.376)

What sorts of "secondary signs" serve to indicate the location of a

phenomenon?

Peirce suggests three sorts of tests.

When a new image optical, acoustical, or other,
appears in the mind, one subjects it to various
tests in order to ascertain whether it be of
internal or external provinance. These tests
may be distributed into three classes, according
to their strength when they testify to externality
of origin (which I call. being "affirmative") and
according to their strength when they testify to
internality of origin (which I call being "negative").
,

Class I. Affirmatively, the strongest; negatively,
the weakest
Tests by physical concomitants; as by photography,
phonography, seismography chemical test papers, and
a great variety of other physical apparatus and observation
,

.

Class II. Affirmatively and negatively of middling
value
Tests by the testified experience of other
observers, or even of oneself at another time,
placed in nearly the same circumstances.
Class III. Affirmatively, the weakest; negatively,
the strongest.
Criticism of all the circumstances of the apparition, ending with the readiest and, in case its
evidence should be negative, the most conclusive of
all single tests, namely that of making a direct inward effort to suppress the apparition. (6. 333-. 33^,
"Some Amazing Mazes: Fourth Curiousity", 1909)

These tests embody various assumptions about internal and external
things.

Class

is physical.

I

tests presuppose, roughly speaking, that the external

External phenomena will interact in regular ways with

other phenomena and these interactions may take place in the absence
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of human observers.

external.

This assumption applies to the non-relatively

The mental activities of other persons are external relative

to a given subject, but they do not form a part of what Peirce calls
the

external world.

The reason Peirce does not consider such relatively

external phenomena in devising his tests for externality is,
guess

,

I

would

that he supposes that the mental states of others never "appear"

before the subject's mind and, hence, the subject has no occasion to ask

whether they belong to his internal world.
Peirce calls Class

I

tests affirmatively the strongest because he

believes that to be (non-relatively) external is to be physical and, as
he sees it, the decisive mark of physicality is lawful interaction with

other physical things.

"Physicality", he says in Minute Logic

in being under the governance of physical causes" (1.253).

,

"consists

Further, as

he makes clear in 8.1UU, the point about cameras and seismometers is

that they record interactions occurring when no observer is present.

Since the non-relative externality is independent of the thoughts of any

particular persons

,

if it can be established that a given phenomenon

takes place when no observer is present, that would be strong evidence
for the phenomenon's thought-independence.

Class

I

tests are negatively

the weakest because our ability to detect interactions between externals
is limited and our judgments about the external world fallible.

The

failure to detect a given phenomenon or to fit it into our scientific

picture of the external world may result from limitations of knowledge
or technology.

of internality.

Hence, such failures do not provide conclusive evidence

102

Class II tests presuppose that the external is public
ally ac-

cessible and persists over tine.

more labile.
reasons.

Internal phenomena are private and

Class II tests are only of middling value for several

First, although a particular internal phenomenon is directly

witnessed by only one person, different people may experience internal
phenomena of the same sort.

Thus, when Peirce discusses hallucinations

in the "Lectures on Pragmatism," he notes that Class II tests are not

always sufficient to establish internality and Class

I

tests may be

required in addition.
Hallucinations proper - obsessional hallucinations will not down at one’s bidding, and people who are
subject to them are accustomed to sound the people
who are with them in order to ascertain whether the
object before them has a being independent of their
disease or not. There are also social hallucinations.
In such cases a photographic camera or other instrument might be of service. (5=117)

Furthermore, an external phenomenon may happen to be detected, or to be
detectable, by only one observer.

Perhaps only one person present has

eyes keen enough to see a very distant or a very minute object.

Like-

wise, some physical objects, such as certain particles created in

nuclear reactors, do not persist long enough for a single observer to

make repeated observations of the same object.

2

For these reasons,

neither the testimony of other persons, nor one's own repeated observation, provide conclusive evidence of internality or externality.
The presuppositions of Class III tests are more difficult to char-

acterize.

Peirce says that Class III tests include, "Criticism of all

the circumstances of the apparition, ending with the readiest and, in

2

This is, of course, my example rather than Peirce's.
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case its evidence should be negative, the most conclusive
of all single

tests, namely that of making a direct inward effort to
suppress the

apparition”.

The final test mentioned, that of attempting to will the

phenomenon away, seems oO suppose that whatever can be dismissed merely

by an act of will is internal.

Peirce calus such tests "the most con-

clusive of all single tests" for internality because nothing would

better demonstrate the thought-dependence of a phenomenon than the subject

s

ability to suppress that phenomenon merely by a thought, i.e.

act 01 direct inward effort or will.

however.

,

an

He fails to notice a problem here,

It seems that sometimes certain external phenomena can be

suppressed merely by a thought.

The movements of the subject provide

one example of such external phenomena.

the only example.)

(Perhaps bodily movements are

Some hold that the subject suppresses movements of

his body on certain occasions simply by willing that they should cease.
In any case,

I

shall leave this as a problem for later discussion.

Considerations similar to those raised above play a large part in
Peirce’s discussion of internality.

In the course of a discussion of

"Pragnatism" in Baldwin’s Dictionary he wrote:

... The greatest
Every man inhabits two worlds
difference between them, by far, is that one of
these two worlds, the Inner World, exerts a comparatively slight compulsion upon us, though we
can by direct effort so slight as to be hardly
while the
noticeable change it greatly
other world, the Outer World, is full of irresistable compulsions for us, and we cannot modify it
in the least except by one particular kind of effort,
muscular effort, and but very slightly even in that
5 ^7^
way
.

.

.

(

•

.

.

;

Indeed, he sometimes seems to regard Class III tests, not merely as one
sort of test for internality

,

"but

as forming the criterion of inter-

nality
are accustomed to speak of an external universe and an inner world of thought.
It comes
to this; there are some ideas
which will
have their own way, and we cannot swerve them
much, and the little effect we can produce upon
them we produce only indirectly. They make up
or indicate the outer world. There are other
ideas which are docile, -they are just what we
think they ought to be
They form the inner
world. (7-^38, Grand Logic 1893)

Vie

.

.

.

.

,

In general, however, Peirce admits that there are various sorts of

internal phenomena not under the subject's voluntary control; as he indicates in the discussion of hallucination quoted from 5*117*

For this

reason, although Peirce seems to regard a phenomenon's being under

voluntary control as conclusive evidence for its internality, its
failure to down at the subject's bidding does not suffice to warrant a

judgment of externality.

Hence, Class III tests are "affirmatively" the

weakest of the three.
One must not be misled by Peirce's ranking of the evidential

strength, affirmative or negative, of the three classes of tests.

considers Class

I

He

and Class II negatively weaker than Class III; Class

being weaker than Class II.

However

,

I

as the discussion of hallucination

shows, Peirce believes that testimony and oests by physical concomitants
do justify judgments of internality.

Since hallucinations propel will

tests connot down at the subject's bidding, the evidence of Class III

cerning them is affirmative, i.e., evidence for externality.

For this
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reason, one subject resorts to the testimony of his companions in order
to ascertain whether such phenomena are internal

.

Even this test may

fail to provide ’negative' evidence and Peirce's comments on "social

hallucinations" suggest that Class

I

tests, negatively the weakest of

the three, can justify one in believing that a phenomenon is internal,

despite affirmative evidence provided by the other tests.

Further, though the test of making a direct inward effort to
suppress an apparition is, when its evidence is negative, the most

decisive of all single tests, there is reason to doubt that it provides

absolutely conclusive grounds for regarding a phenomenon as internal.
have already pointed out a difficulty with Class III tests.

I

Such tests

presuppose that whatever is under the control of the subject's direct
inward efforts belongs to the inner world.

It seems, however, that the

subject's bodily movements - presumably external phenomena. - are so
controlled, at least on occasion.

Peirce might reject this latter

claim, but in any case he should have something to say for himself here.

Before considering what Peirce might say about the point raised
above, it is worth noting that things pertaining to the subject's body

present some special difficulties.

The problem of location has two

aspects, which Peirce does not clearly distinguish.

It concerns first

attribution to the self; identifying a particular thing as one's own.
Second, it involves ascribing phenomena to one's inner world.

One's

bodily movements are non-transferably one's own and may be described as
activities of the self but they do not belong to one's inner world.

1

Go

The epistemological issues raised by the question of how one knows that
they are activities of oneself resemble in many respects those raised by

asking the same sort of question about one's thoughts.

In particular,

one's control over one's body provides evidence for the claim that it
is one's own.

That one has such control over a phenomenon does not in

itself constitute conclusive evidence that the phenomenon in question

belongs to one's internal world.
How, then, is one to decide whether the movements of one's body

belong to the internal or the external world?

Peirce might claim that

Class III tests cause no problem here, because one's bodily movements
are not really under the control of direct inward effort

.

Although he

does not say how one determines whether one can control something by

direct inward effort, he might take the following experiment as

vant test:

a

rele-

Suppose that the subject takes curare or some other para-

lytic agent which allows him to retain consciousness.

Any phenomena

which he can control under such circumstances are under the control of
his direct inward effort.

That is to say, only what the subject can

control under any conditions in which he can think at all is under the

control of his direct inward efforts.

Only this sort of control, Peirce

might maintain, counts as evidence of internality.
The experiment envisioned above is fairly exotic and one might

question whether what happens under such extreme conditions should serve
subject’s voluntary
as the standard for determining the limits of the
control.

and the
It would seem more plausible to resort to testimony

movements.
evidence of physical concomitants to locate bodily

Since
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the movements of one's tody are open to public inspection

arid

register

on various sorts of recording devices, one has strong evidence for their

externality.

That one should have recourse to Class

I

and II tests in

establishing the location of one's bodily movements indicates that Class
III tests do not provide conclusive evidence for internality, since, on

the evidence of Class III tests, they are internal.

Nor is it clear

from Peirce's remark that Class III tests represent "the most conclusive
of all single tests" for internality that he regards them as absolutely

conclusive.

In any case, I shall later argue that the evaluation of

evidence provided by Class III tests depends upon the evidence of tests
in the ether two classes.

Intuition and the problem of location

According to the discussion of epistemic immediacy in Chapter III,
Peirce needs to do two things in order to establish that we do not have

immediate knowledge of the internal as internal:

first, he needs to

show that there is evidence relevant to the justification of judgments

ascribing various phenomena to one's inner world and, second, he must
show that one is not justified in believing that a phenomenon belongs to
one's inner world unless one is also warranted in accepting such evidence.

How do his views concerning the nature of the internal and the

three classes of tests for internality fit into this project?
One may represent Peirce's argument against immediate knowledge of
the internal as internal as follows:

He begins by explaining what it is

for something to belong to the subject's inner world:

a thing belongs
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to that world if it is dependent upon the subject's thoughts.

He then

considers what would count as evidence that something depends upon the
subject's thoughts.

He proposes three marks of thought-dependence:

lack of physical concomitants, privacy, and subjugation to direct inward
effort.

The three classes of tests set out in "Some Amazing Mazes"

serve to assess whether a given phenomenon has any of the characteristics mentioned.

Thus, his discussion of the test has a dual purpose.

It points out three sorts of statements which, if true, count as evi-

dence for the truth of the subject's belief that a given phenomenon

belongs to his internal world:

That is, statements asserting that the

phenomenon in question lacks physical concomitants, that the subject has

privileged access to the phenomenon, or that the subject can suppress it
by direct inward effort.

Further, his discussion suggests three sorts

of tests or evidence which make such statements rationally acceptable:

respectively, the evidence provided by measuring instruments of various
sorts, the testimony of other observers, and the exercise of direct

inward effort against the phenomenon in question.

If the above pro-

posals are correct, Peirce has accomplished the first half of his task.
Are these proposals correct?

They are at least plausible.

Peirce’s

account of internality as thought-dependence seems reasonable enough.
It does not differ in any important way from Descartes' own account

according to which things internal are modifications of conscious substance and, hence, dependent upon consciousness.

Further, that some

phenomenon is under the control of the subject's will, private, or lacks
in
physical concomitants does constitute evidence that the phenomenon
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question is dependent upon the subject's thoughts.

Peirce does not say

that these three considerations provide the only evidence for internality.

He maintains only that, if a phenomenon exhibits one or more of

these characteristics

,

the subject has some reason to believe that it

belong to his internal world.

Finally, the three sorts of tests pro-

posed do provide evidence that a thing possesses the appropriate characteristics

.

What of the second half of Peirce’s task?

Is the sort of evidence

provided by the three tests indispensible for the justification of
judgments ascribing phenomena to the subject's inner world?

The Cartesian

can admit that the considerations Peirce mentions do provide evidence
for internality.

He denies, however, that the subject need be warranted

in accenting such evidence in order to know that a thing belongs to the

If successful, this reply blocks the second half of Peirce's

inner world.

argument against immediate knowledge of the internal as internal.

To

decide whether the Cartesian's response succeeds, one must ask whether,

supposing that one is not warranted in believing that a given phenomenon
is under his voluntary control, or private, or lacks physical concomi-

tants, it is plausible to contend that one is justified in taking that

phenomenon to be a feature of one's inner world?
admitted,

I

As I previously

know of no rigorous procedure for settling such questions.

Nevertheless,

I

offer the following remarks in support of Peirce's

answer
phenomenon 0 and that
Let us suppose that a subject S encounters a
S has no

b>
justification for believing either that he can suppress 0
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direct in-ward effort, or that he enjoys privileged access
to 0, or that
0 lacks physical concomitants.

explanation.

.-/hat

This last supposition requires further

Peirce calls "tests by physical concomitants" allow

one to ascertain whether a given phenomenon manifests itself
when no

numan observers are present.

In his review of Pearson he describes the

sorts of evidence taken into account in deciding whether a particular

object

,

an inkstand, is an external things.

may call this into question. But as soon
I find that the inkstand appears there
in spite of me.
If I turn away my eyes, other witnesses will tell me that it still remains.
If we
all leave the room and dismiss the matter from our
thought , still a photographic camera would show the
inkstand still there, with the same roundness polish
and transparency, and with the same opaque liquid
within
Thus, ... I confirm myself in the opinion
that its characters are what they are, and persist
at every opportunity in revealing themselves
regardless of what you, or I, or any man, or any generation
of men may think.
(8.lU4)
(my emphasis.)
.

.

.

I

as I do that

,

.

,

When one applies a Class
in the absence of S.

I

test to 0, one tests to see whether 0 persists

What one grants when one allows that S is not

warranted in believing that 0 lacks "physical concomitants" is that S is
not warranted supposing that he must be present in order for 0 to occur.

Wow if S is not justified in taking 0 to be under his control, nor in

believing that 0 is private to him, nor even in believing that his
presence is required for 0's existence, then it seems to me implausible
to maintain that, nevertheless, S warrantedly regards 0 as a feature of

his internal world, something dependent upon his thoughts.
I

should emphasize that

I

am not here claiming that S must believe
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that 0 has any of the marks of thought-dependence mentioned above.

I

contend only that his warrant for believing that 0 belongs to his interna]

world is conditional on whether he
those marks to 0.

is

warranted in ascribing some of

This condition can hold whether or not S actually

believes that 0 has the features in question.
One might object to my defense of Peirce on the grounds that it

presupposes that S accepts Peirce's conception of relative internality.
Suppose, a critic might argue, that S employs a different conception of

internality, one according to which none claims investigated in Class
Class III tests constitute evidence for relative internality.

I -

In that

case, the evidence discussed above would be irrelevant to the justifi-

cation of S's belief that 0 belongs to his internal world.
The above objection tells against Peirce only on the supposition

that it is reasonable to attribute to S the belief that 0 belongs to his
By way of an example, consider a person who says that a

inner world.

particular thing is a lump of gold, but regards it as irrelevant to the
justification of his claim whether the thing in question is a metal, is
malleable, has a certain color, a certain atomic weight, etc.
some point,

I

There is

think, at which one should cease to attribute to such a

person a belief correctly expressible in the ordinary location, 'This is
gold'.

Similarly, Peirce can argue that a subject whose conception oi

dependence
internality is such that evidence concerning a phenomenon's
the justification of the
on the subject's thoughts is irrelevant to

his inner world.
belief that the phenomenon in question belongs to
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cannot

"be

properly

said, to

have that oerief

.

Peirce’s account of the

evidence for internality does depend upon his conception of the internal.

But it matters whether that conception captures the ordinary

notion of internality, or at least, an essential part of that notion.
Before closing the discussion of immediate knowledge of the internal
as internal, I should mention two further problems.

First, a Cartesian

might grant that, to know that something is internal, the subject must
be justified in believing that it. is under the control of his direct
inward efforts, or that it is private, and so forth, but maintain that
this merely shows that direct experience of a phenomenon suffices to

justify the claim that it has those features.

That is, he might argue

that the subject knows immediately whether a phenomenon is under his
control, private, or lacks physical concomitants.

Given Peirce’s notion

of internality, this claim may be regarded as simply a more precise

version of the thesis that the subject knows immediately whether a

phenomenon belongs to his inner world.
difference between the two claims.

But, there is an important

If we simply ask ourselves whether

the latter is true, without considering what is involved in regarding

something as internal, it is very difficult to form any estimate of the
claim’s plausibility.

But, when we consider the former, it seems to me

apparent that it is not at all plausible to suppose that merely by

experiencing a phenomenon the subject can tell whether he can suppress
it by inward effort, whether he has privileged access to it, or whether

it will persist in his absence.

By developing the consequences

oi

the
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Cartesian position on immediate knowledge of the internal as internal,

Peirce exposes implausibilities which are not obvious on first inspection.

Second, one might object that Peirce's three tests for internality

presuppose some knowledge of the internal as internal and, hence, cannot
account for the justification of all our claims to such knowledge.

In

particular, one can obtain evidence from Class III tests only if one can

reliably determine whether one has exerted a direct inward effort.

In

order to justify the belief that a given phenomenon is internal by means
of a Class III test, therefore, one must already be able to recognize

whether certain sorts of activities, direct efforts, belong to one's
internal world.
Peirce could reply to this objection in a number of ways.

Its most

important short-coming, however, is that it misunderstands his argument.
That argument does not aim to establish any sort of precedence among the

things we know.

It does not contend that the subject must first deter-

mine that he can suppress a phenomenon by direct inward effort and then
infer from this that the phenomenon belongs to his internal world.

Rather, the argument is that statements ascribing phenomena to the subject's inner world are linked with other sorts of statements in such a

way that the subject is not justified in accepting certain of the latter.
Exactly what this kind of linkage implies about the temporal precedence
derivation, can be
of some sorts of knowledge over other sorts, or about

ascertained only within a general theory of knowledge.

In Question

llU

Four

3

Peirce aims to establish that inner knowledge derives from a pre-

vious knowledge of the external world.

The argument presently under

consideration makes no such assumption concerning the relation between

knowledge of the internal as internal and the evidence provided by the
three classes of tests.
Thus,

I

think Peirce has good reason to suppose that there is evi-

dence relevant to the subject's judgments of internality and that the

subject requires such evidence in order to be warranted in believing
that a thing belongs to his internal world.

This entitles Peirce to

reject the Cartesian doctrine that we have intuitive or immediate knowledge of the internal as internal.

Knowledge of the internal as internal and external judgments

The foregoing section concerns Peirce's argument
the internal as internal is inferential.

stronger conclusion:

knowledge of

tha.t

He wants to establish a

That the inferences required for knowing that

something belongs to the inner world involve judgments about the external
world.

In line with the interpretation of Peirce's claims about infer-

entiality in the preceding

section,

thesis be understood as follows

:

I

suggested that his stronger

For any statement asserting that some

subject
phenomenon belongs to the subject’s inner world such that the

knows that p is true, there is a body of statement

distinct from p, such that (i) the truth of

e^

e

e.

.

.

•

,

e

n,

each

constitutes

n

justified in believing
evidence for the truth of p, (ii) the subject is not
that p is true unless he is justified in accepting

e^

,

.

.

.,

e ^,

and

statement about the external world.
(iii) at least one of e ± - e n is a
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If the argument of the preceding section is correct, Peirce has

established (i) and (ii) above.

Further, it seems that he has estab-

lished (i) and (ii) in a way which shows that the third condition is

satisfied as well.
Class

I

After all, to know that one has carried out a

or Class II test, one must know that, for example, certain

instruments have given such and such reading, or that some other person
has offered testimony.

and it would appear that

These are what Peirce calls "external facts",
,

since Class

I

and II tests figure in the

justification of beliefs concerning the internal as internal, some of
the statements one uses as evidence for such beliefs will be external

statements

Peirce has not established, however, that all three sorts of tests
are indispensible for knowledge of the internal as internal.

This is

important for the current discussion because one class of tests. Class III,
seems not to require any judgments about the external world.

To perform

a Class III test one simply makes a direct inward effort to suppress a

phenomenon.

If the phenomenon goes away, one has, according to Peirce,

excellent evidence that it was an internal phenomenon.

Should this sort

of evidence be sufficient to warrant a verdict of internality

have knowledge of the internal as internal.

,

one would

No judgments about the

of this
external world seem to have played any part in one's attainment

knowledge.

Thus, one might conclude, condition (iii) fails to hold for

internal.
some instances of knowledge of the internal as

Peirce needs
In order to block the argument sketched above,

m

show

one has suppressed a
that one cannot be justified in believing that

justified in accepting
phenomenon by direct inward effort unless one is

Il6

certain sorts of statements about the external things.

The preceding

paragraph suggests that one can tell whether one has suppressed a

phenomenon simply by seeing whether it goes away after an inward exertion.

But, what is it for a phenomenon to 'go away'?

If this means

only that the subject is no longer conscious of the phenomenon, then the
subject can suppress a phenomenon simply by shifting his attention
elsewhere.

In that case, many unproblematically external phenomena are

suppressible by inward effort.

to terminate its existence.

Rather, to suppress a phenomenon must be

The subject is not justified in concluding

that a phenomenon has ceased to exist simply by the fact that he is no

longer conscious of it.

External phenomena persist whether or not he is

conscious of them.

How can the subject tell whether he has suppressed a phenomenon?
In line with Peirce's discussion of the three sorts of tests, it is

natural to suggest that, in addition to simply looking for himself, he
might rely on the testimony of other observers or on tests by physical
concomitants.

Indeed, unless he is warranted in believing that the

phenomenon in question lacks physical concomitants at a time t, i.e. is
not interacting with physical phenomena at t, and is not observed to
3
exist at t by other persons

,

he is not justified in supposing that he

has suppressed the phenomenon at t.

Both the belief that a phenomenon

lacks physical concomitants and the belief that other persons do not

By this I do not mean that the observation takes place at t,
but that it is observed that the phenomenon exists at t.
3

observe a phenomenon are beliefs about things external to the subject
(though, in the later case, the belief may not concern anything which is

non-relatively external):

That is to say, the statements expressing

what the subject believes in each case are external statements.

Further,

it would seem that, with respect to any particular phenomenon, whether

the subject is justified in having such beliefs depends upon whether he
is justified in accepting specific external-statements, e.g.,

denied having witnessed the phenomenon

1

,

'So and so

'The camera was in place and

functioning properly, but the photographs reveal no sign of the phenomenon'

,

and so forth.

Thus, in order to be justified in believing, on

the basis of a Class III test, that something is internal, one must also

be justified in accepting certain external-statements.

Other sorts of considerations also reveal the dependence of Clans
III tests on beliefs about external things.

Class III tests provide

evidence of internality only on the assumption that the subject cannot
suppress external phenomena by direct inward effort.

Otherwise, one

s

success in eliminating a phenomenon by inward effort would provide no

reason for denying that the phenomenon was external.

Hence, the evi-

dential value of Class III depends to some extent on the acceptability
of an assumption concerning the nature of external things.

immediate
Thus, Peirce's argument against the claim that we have
an argument for
knowledge of the internal as internal, provides him with
facts' as well.
his view that such knowledge 'derives from external

CONCLUSION

Hov does Peirce's critique of introspection stand in light of the
three arguments discussed?

In Question Four he undertakes a radical

criticism of the Cartesian tradition regarding our knowledge of the
inner world.

The Cartesian holds that we have intuitive knowledge of

things internal and that such knowledge provides the foundation from

which we derive what we know concerning the external world.

The argu-

ment of Question Four strikes at both positions, contending not merely
that inner knowledge is inferential, hut that it derives by inference

from external facts.

Unfortunately, that argument fails to establish

its ambitious conclusions.

The Externalization Thesis will not support

the epistemological weight Peirce requires it to bear.

Peirce's later arguments do something to retrieve his critique of
introspection.

The argument in "Consequences" shows that we do not have

intuitive knowledge of certain modes of thought and suggests a strategy
for showing that none of the modes of thought are known immediately.

To

carry out this strategy he must establish for each mode, as he does for
anger and cognition, that our ability to distinguish instances of that

mode depends upon our knowledge of the context of thought in which it
occurs.

This requires a careful, case by case discussion of the various

modes of thought.

The success of this strategy in dealing with such

disparate modes as cognition and anger indicates that it may be broadly
applicable
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The final argument supports a limited version of Peirce’s claim

that inner knowledge derives from external facts.

It shows that, in so

far as our beliefs about our internal phenomena involve the belief that

these phenomena are psychical, or belong to someone’s inner world, these

beliefs cannot be justified for us unless we are also justified in

making certain suppositions about external things.

This does not

establish that all knowledge of the internal as internal derives from a
temporally prior knowledge of the external world.

It does, however,

uncover an intimate interdependence between the knowledge that something
belongs to the inner world and beliefs about the external one.
The conclusions to which his later arguments entitle him are weaker

than the conclusions Peirce infers from the argument of Question Four.
In order to vindicate his claim that all our knowledge of the inner

world derives from external facts, he needs to do a good deal more.

He

must find some way to deal with knowledge of qualities of feeling, for
example.

But, whether or not he can salvage the radical thesis pro-

pounded in Question Four, Peirce's later arguments constitute a significant criticism of the Cartesian tradition on introspective knowledge.
His critique of introspection is a qualified success as it stands.
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